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Pubilo  Sclof  "  ap nt
and Private Sector Development
Four types of problems affect public sector pay  economic and sector work to address these prob-
and employment:  lems.  In its efforts to support reform of public
sector pay and employment, the Bank should:
Too much spent  on wages  in the public
sector (and too little on supplies and mainte-  *  Systematically analyze the politics of the
nance).  reforn  process, and more fully research key pay
and employment issues (such as nonwage
* Overstaffed bureaucracies.  allowance systems and supplementary benefit
schemes).
•  The erosions of public service salaries -
with individual wages too low despite the high  *  Allow flexibility (and some country auton-
overall budg,et  for salaries.  omy) in designing reform, so a country will
"own" its own reform.
e  Too small a gap between high and low
wages - which constrains the govemment's  * Look beyond short-term reform to such me-
ability to hire and keep qualified personnel at the  dium-term issues as redeployment, retraining,
middle and upper levels.  and pension and severance obligations.
The Bank has used strucural  adjustment  *  Recruit personnel specialized in pay and
loans, technical assistance projects, and country  employment operations or offer specialized
training to Bank staff.
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In the  wake  of the  severe  economic  crises  of  recent  years,  many
developing  countries  have  begun  to confront  the  difficult  task  of  making
their  public  sectors  more  productive.  The  need  to reform  public  pay  and
employment  policies  has  come  to  be seen  as an important  element  in  meeting
this  challenge. National  economic  adjustment  strategies,  often  with
support  from  the  International  Monetary  Bank  and  the  World  Bank,  have
increasingly  focused  on these  issues. Attention  to  public  pay  and
employment  stems  in  part from  the  pressure  placed  by fiscal  constraints  on
the  wage  bill,  which  in  many  countries  constitutes  a  major  share  of public
expenditures.  Concern  has  also  been  prompted  by the  growing  recognition
that  conditions  of pay  and  employment  may  be key inhibitors  of government
performance.  Indeed,  overstaffed  bureaucracies  afflicted  by eroding  salary
scales,  pervasive  demoralization,  corruption,  moonlighting,  and  chronic
absenteeism  are  often  unable  to  carry  out  the  essential  economic  policy  and
management  tasks  that  are  a  key  part  of emergency  economic  recovery
programs.
In response  to these  conditions,  the  Bank's  involvement  in  public
pay  and  employment  reform  has  grown  rapidly.  The  character  and  extent  of
Bank  interventions  have  varied  and  Bank  policy  objectives  have  not  always
been  consistent,  however. Also,  diverse  types  of lending  instruments  and
analytic  techniques  have  been  utilized. Bank  activities  in this  area  have
generally  been ad  hoc and  have  preceded  the  formulation  of systematic
policy  guidance. Moreover,  the  rapid  expansion  of Bank  work  on pay  and
employment  has  not  allowed  time  for  considered  analysis  of the  potential
effectiveness  of the  various  approaches  taken. This  has  been  exacerbated
by an insufficient  exchange  of experience  by Bank  staff  working  in  this
area.
This  paper  offers  an interim  review  of the  Bank's  experience  with
public  sector  pay  and  employment  reform. Its  aim  is to  establish  what  has
been done  and  what  has  been learned  to  date. The  review  has limited
objectives:  It seeks  to inventory  and  analyze  Bank  operational  work  in
selected  countries  and  to  provide  a  brief  guide  to  bank  research  and  policy
work  on this  subject. The  review  covers  the  period  between  1981  and
February  1987. The  paper  tries  to  draw  attention  to issues  that  have
emerged  in  the  early  phases  of these  activities  and  make  some  tentative
suggestions  about  directions  for  future  Bank  work  rather  than  draw
definitive  conclusions  about  the  impact  of these  efforts. The  review
covers  only  the  Bank's  experience  with  pay  and  employment  policy  issues  in
central  governments  (generally  with  particular  reference  to the  civil
service). For  the  most  part,  this  focus  excludes  reforms  undertaken  on the
level  of individual  state  enterprises  or through  wholesale  reforms  of state
enterprise  sectors. Pay  and  employment  issues  that  have  been  addressed  on
an individual  sectoral  level  (  e.g.  in  an individual  ministry  of
agriculture)  are  also  excluded  from  the  survey.- ii  -
Between  July  1981  and  February  1987,  public  employment  and  pay
issues  in  central  governments  figured  prominently  in  45 Bank  lending
operations  in  24 countries.  West  Africa  accounted  for  more  than  one-third
of these  operations;  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  had  sligntly  more  than
one-fourth;  and  the  rest  were  distributed  fairly  evenly  among  East  Asia,
South  Asia,  EMENA,  and  East  Africa.
Despite  a heterogenous  sample  of countries  and  cases  examined,
four  principal  types  of  problems  were identified  as  characteristic  of the
group  as a  whole: excessive  public  sector  wage  bills;  surplus  numbers  of
civil  servants;  erosion  of  public  service  salaries;  and,  wage compression.
The  principal  instruments  used  by the  Bank  to  address  these  problems  were
structural  adjustment  loans,  technical  assistance  projects,  and  country
economic  and  sector  work. A variety  of operational  approaches  were
utilized.  The  most  sweeping  approach  has  been  to  call  for  reduction  of the
wage  bill tuLrough  salary  restraint. Freezing  wages  is  usually  at  best  a
temporary  solution  and tends  to  reinforce  inequities  or  wage  compression
within  salary  structures.  Employment  reforms  which  aimed  at  cutting
numbers  of civil  servants  included:  efforts  to eliminate  phantom  workers  or
ghosts;  elimination  of  officially  sanctioned  posts;  retrenchment  of
temporary  workers;  enforcement  of retirement  rules;  a freeze  of initial
recruitment  and/or  prevention  of guaranteed  entry  into  the  civil  service  of
university  graduates;  and  voluntary  retirement  of surplus  workers. The
most  difficult  political  step  taken  by governments  is the  actual  dismissal
of civil  servants. The  political  impact  of this  action  is  sometimes
mitigated  by public  education  programs  or competency  testing. Although  the
Bank  has, in  some  cases,  encouraged  civil  servant  reduction,  such  as the
design  of severance  benefits  or  redeployment  and  retraining  schemes. These
factors  may significantly  influence  the  outcome  of reforms.
Where  low  public  sector  salaries  and  wage  compression  posed  a
problem  in  attracting  qualified  staff  to  central  government,  the  Bank
sometimes  recommend  selective  upward  wage adjustments,  with  varying  degrees
of success. Other  mechanisms  for  attracting  higher  level  personnel  were
also  explored. These  included  senior  executive  services,  the  use  of local
consultants,  secondment  from  public  enterprise3,  and  compensation  through
non-wage  allowance  and  benefits  systems.
Some  of the  operational  techniques  financed  by the  Bank  to  carry
out  the  above  reforms  included  improvements  in  the  data  collection  capacity
of  personnel  management  systems,  civil  service  censuses,  functional  reviews
of  whole  governments  or selected  ministries,  diagnostic  studies  of  various
aspects  of pay  and  employment  issues  in  the  civil  service.
The institutional  arrangements  for  pay  and  employment  reform  have
varied,  but in  general,  reform  efforts  located  in  more  autonomous
institutions  with  greater  access  to  higher  levels  of government  have  a
better  chance  of succeeding.- iii  -
Much  of the  Bank's  work  on  public  pay  and  employment  reform  has
been carried  out  through  country  and  economic  sector  work in the  form  of
Country  Economic  Memoranda  (CEM). Country  Economic  and  Sector  Work  may  be
either  the  precursor  to  Bank  lending  in this  area,  or it  may  constitute
policy  dialogue  which  becomes  the  main  mechanism  for  Bank-country  relations
on this  issue. The  Bank  has  also  financed  research  on  public  pay  and
employment.  This  research  has focused  predominantly  on  Africa  and  has
provided  an analytic  framework  for  dealing  with the  economic  aspects  of  pay
and  employment  rerorm. This  paper  suggests  that  future  research  should
attempt  to:  expand  the  data  base  through  in-depth  studies  of pay  and
employment  problems  in  specific  countries;  undertake  comprehensive  studies
of government  service  incentive  systems,  including  analysis  of salary
structures,  career  paths,  non-wage  allowance  and  pension  systems,  and
relevant  tax  provisions;  review  severance  scheme  experiences;  study  the
political  and  social  consequences  of  pay  and  employment  reform,  and  review
case  studies  of  employment  and  pay  experiences  in individual  sectors  and
public  enterprises.
The  paper  raises  a number  of issues  for  consideration  and  offers
conclusions  based  on its  findings,  including  the  following:
- Political  factors  are  crucial  to the  success  of  pay and
employment  reforms. Systematic  analysis  of the  politics  of the
reform  process,  largely  absent  from  Bank  sector  work,  needs  to
be incorporated  into  CESW  and  in  direct  preparation  of  Bank
projects.
- Governments  must  feel  full  "ownership"  of reforms,  and  thus  a
style  must  be struck  which  allows  for  the  appropriate  mix  of
Bank  leverage  and  country  autonomy  in  design  of these  programs.
- Bank  pay  and  employment  operations  have tended  to take  a short
term  perspective,  ignoring  issues  of redeployment,  retraining
and  pension  and  severance  obligations.  The  Bank  should  take  a
more  comprehensive  approach  that  considers  all  stages  of the
reform  process  and  makes  more  specific  provision  for
implementation  over  the  medium  term.
- Conflicting  objectives  relating  to  goals  of fiscal  soundness,
bureaucratic  efficiency  of developmental  strategies  need  to  be
clarified  from  the  outset  of Bank  operations  and  should  be
discussed  and  coordinated  with  the  IMF  to  ensure  program
coherence.
- Bank  operations  are  being  carried  out  in  the  absence  of adequate
information  about  key  pay  and  employment  issues. Bank  sponsored
research  and  CESW  should  be expanded  to  examine  such  aspects  as
non-wage  allowance  systems,  labor  market  absorptive  capacity  and
supplementary  benefit  schemes  such  as social  security  programs,
to name  a few.- iv  -
No single  lending  instrument  could  be identified  as  most
suitable  for  bringing  about  desired  changes  in  pay  and
employment  systems. Indeed,  flexibility  in  operational  approach
and  style  is  required. Although  SALs  have  been found  effective
for  stimulating  reform,  one-shot  conditionality  is  probably  less
appropriate  than  serial  cot.,itionality  supported  by an
institutional  infrastructura  provided  either  through  specific
SAL  components,  companion  technical  assistance  projects  or
medium-term  sectoral  support  projects  with institutional
development  components.
- Given  the  staff  intensive  character  of  pay  and  employment
operations,  appropriate  arrangements  for  supervision  and  staff
time  allocation  need  to  be devised.
- Given  the  complex  and  multi-disciplinary  nature  of  pay and
employment  operations,  specialized  training  for  Bank  staff
and/or  recruitment  of  personnel  with  the  appropriate  skills  may
be required.
- Although  the  Bank  has  taken  a lead  in  the  area  of public  sector
pay  and  employment  reform,  the  experience  of outside
institutions  and  of individual  developed  and  developing
countries  themselves  needs  to  be examined  more thoroughly.PUBLIC  SECTOR PAY AND EMPLOYMENT  POLICY  ISSUES  IN  BANK LENDING:
AN  INTERIM REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the  wake  of the  severe  economic  crises  of recent  years,  many
developing  countries  have  begun  to  confront  the  difficult  task  of  making
their  public  sectors  more  productivs.  The  need  to reform  public  pay  and
employment  nolicies  has come  to  be seen  as  an important  element  in  meeting
this  challerge. National  economic  adjustment  strategies,  often  with
support  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank,  have
increasingly  focused  on these  issues. Attention  to  public  pay  and
employment  stems  in  part  from  the  pressure  placed  by fiscal  constraints  on
the  wage  bill,  which  in  many  countries  constitutes  a  major  share  of  public
expenditures.  Concern  has also  been  prompted  by the  growing  recognition
that  conditions  of  pay  and  employment  may  be key inhibitors  of government
performance.  Indeed,  overstaffed  bureaucracies  afflicted  by eroding  salary
scales,  pervasive  demoralization,  corruption,  moonlighting,  and  chronic
absenteeism  are  often  unable  to  carry  out  the  essential  economic  policy  and
management  tasks  that  are  a  key  part  of  emergency  economic  recovery
programs.
In response  to these  conditions,  the  World  Bank's  involvement  in
public  pay  and  employment  reform  has  grown  rapidly. The  character  and
extent  of Bank  interventions,  however,  have  varied  considerably  from  one
country  or  operation  to  another. Bank  policy  objectives  have  not  always
been  consistent,  and  the  types  of lending  instruments  and  analytic
techniques  utilized  have  been  diverse. For  the  most  part,  in fact,  Bank
activities  in thiis  area  have  been  ad  hoc in  nature  and  have  preceded  the
formulation  of systematic  policy  guidance. Moreover,  the  rapid  expansion
of Bank  work on  pay  and  employment  has  not  allowed  time  for  considered
analysis  of the  potential  effectiveness  of the  various  approaches  taken.
This  has  been  exacerbated  by a  minimal  exchange  of  experience  by staff
working  on  pay  and  employment  issues.
This  paper  offers  an interim  review  of the  Bank's  experience  with
public  sector  pay  and  employment  reform. Its  aim  is to  establish  what  has
been  done  and  what  has  been  learned  to date. The  review  has  limited
objectives:  It seeks  to inventory  and  analyze  Bank  operational  work in
selected  countries  and  to  provide  a  brief  guide  to  Bank  research  and  policy
work  on this  subject. The  review  covers  the  period  between  1981,  when
significant  Bank  involvement  in this  area  could  first  be documented,  and
February  1987. Given  the  preliminary  stage  of  most  Bank initiatives  in
public  pay  and  employment  reform,  relatively  little  can  be definitively
concluded  about  the  impact  of Bank  efforts. Instead,  the  paper  tries  to
draw  attention  to issues  that  have  emerged  in  the  early  phases  of these
activities  and  make  some  tentative  suggestions  about  directions  for  future
Bank  work.-2-
The  review  covers  only  the  Bank's  experience  with  pay  and
employment  policy  issues  in  central  governments  (generally  with  particular
reference  to the  civil  service). For  the  most  part,  this  focus  excludes
reforms  undertaken  on the  level  of individual  state  enterprises  or through
wholesale  reforms  of state  enterprise  sectors. Pay  and  employment  issues
that  have  been addressed  on  an individual  sectoral  level  (e.g.,  in an
individual  ministry  of agriculture)  are  also  excluded  from  the  survey. The
decision  to exclude  a potentially  rich  body  of data  on these  subjects  from
the  present  study  derives  simply  from  the  need  to  limit  the  review's  scope.
To the  extent  that  pay  and  employment  reforms  in  other  spheres  overlap  with
central  government  initiatives  and  can  be captured  through  anecdotal
evidepce,  however,  they  may  be touched  upon  in the  present  discussion.  The
review  covers  Bank  activities  both in  direct  lending  and  in  Country
Economic  and  Sector  Work.  Inclusion  under  one  of these  categories  required
either  that  a substantial  portion  of  CESW  be devoted  to  public  pay  and
employment  issues  or that  some  specific  recommendation  or direct  action
regarding  these  issues  be embodied  in the  conditionality  or  project
component  of a Bank  lending  operation. Thus,  cases  in  which  general  Bank-
country  policy  dialogue  on  pay  and  employment  questions  was  not  accompanied
by any  documented  follow-up  are  not  treated  here.  It  is important  to  note
as  well that  many  Bank  initiatives  have taken  place  in  the  context  of
ongoing  country  programs,  often  in  the  midst  of IMF  agreements. It  is
sometimes  difficult  to  draw  a sharp  line  dividing  Bank,  country,  and  IMF
activities.  Finally,  pay  and  employment  reform  experiences  in  developing
countries  where  there  has  been  on IBRD  intervention  in  this  area  are  also
excluded  from  the  sample.
Section  II  of this  paper  begins  with  an overview  of the  main
characteristics  of Bank  involvement  in  public  pay  and  employment  issues.
This  overview  considers  common  problems,  lending  instruments  used  to
address  these  problems,  recommended  policy  reforms  and  institutional
arrangements,  and  actual  operational  techniques  utilized. Section  III
briefly  reviews  country  economic  and  sector  work  and  research  performed
within  the  Bank  on  public  pay  and  employment  issues. In section  IV,  major
issues  that  have  emerged  in  Bank  work  are  highlighted.  The  fifth  and  final
section  draws  some  tentative  conclusions  about  Bank  activities  and  suggests
directions  for  future  work.
II.  OVERVIEW  OF BANK  OPERATIONAL  EXPERIENCE  IN PUBLIC  PAY
AND  EMPLOYMENIT  REFORM
Between  July  1981  and  February  1987,  public  employment  and  pay
issues  in  central  governments  figured  prominently  in  45 Bank  lending
operations  in 24  countries.  (Tables  1  and  2  show  approved  and  proposed
operations  respectively).  Africa  accounted  for  more  than  one-third  of
these  operations;  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  had  slightly  more  than
one-fourth;  and  the  rest  were  distributed  fairly  evenly  among  Asia  and
EMENA.  (See  Table  3)  In  addition  to  direct  lending,  public  pay  and
employment  issues  have  also  received  substantial  treatment  in  Country  and
Economic  Sector  Work  products;  approximately  20 Country  Economic  Memoranda
included  significant  discussions  of (and  made  concrete  policy- 3 -
recommendations  about)  public  employment  and  pay  issues. (Table  4 shows
countries  for  which  significant  Country  Economic  and  Sector  Work in  this
area  was  performed). Public  pay  and  employment  policy  reform  was  also  the
subject  of a growing  bcoly  of Bank  executed  research. (The  bibliography
attached  to this  review  contains  specific  citations  to this  research).
A.  IDENTIFYING  THE  PROBLEM
The  countries  examined  here  are  diverse,  not  only  in  terms  of
prevailing  conditions  of public  employment,  but  also  with regard  to the
Bank  interventions  they  have  experienced.  Despite  this  heterogeneity,  four
principal  problem  types  can  be identified  as characteristic  of the  group  as
a  whole: 1
(i)  Excessive  Rublic  sector  wage  bills. Excessiveness  is  a
subjective  quality,  one  for  which  no clear  measurement
methodology  exists,  and  no standardized  approach  is  applied
throughout  the  Bank.  In  general,  the  wage  bill is  measured
against  one  of the  following: the  overall  government  budget;
overall  government  revenues;  GDP;  or total  recurrent
expenditures.  The  latter  measure  is  perhaps  the  most  common,  and
the  degree  to  which  non-personnel  recurrent  expenditures  (such  as
those  for  supplies  and  maintenance)  diminish  in relation  to
personnel  expenditures  is  taken  as a  key  signal  that  the  wage
bill is inappropriately  high. 2
(ii) Surplus  Rublic  servants.  Although  obviously  related  to  the  size
of the  wage  bill,  the  appropriate  number  of civil  servants  is
often  derl-ed  ad  hoc from  the  proportion  of public  servants  to
the  overall  population,  to the  modern  sector  labor  force,  or  from
somewhat  casual  observati¢ns  of "too  many  people  sitting  around
doing  nothing." Sometimes  the  rate  of  expansion  of public
employment,  especially  when  disproportionate  to  GNP  or overall
labor  force  growth  rates,  is taken  as  a warning  signal  of  surplus
numbers  in government.  Clearly,  the  definition  of  what
constitutes  "too  many"  in  the  public  sector  must  consider  the
relative  role  of the  state  in the  economy,  the  level  of  a
country's  development,  and  the  relative  importance  of the  state
as  a primary  source  of political  patronage  and  social  welfare.
To identify  a personnel  surplus,  most  Bank  staff  rely  upon the
indicator  cited  above;  that  is,  insufficient  operating  budgets
for  supplies  and  maintenance. 3
(iii) Erosion  of Rublic  service  salaries. In  many  countries  the  level
of real  public  sector  salaries--and  particularly  civil  service
salaries--has  eroded  substantially  over  time. The  result  is
remuneration  that  is  too  low  either  to sustain  lower  echelon
1/  Table  5  classifies  countries  surveyed  according  to these  four  problems.
2/  A thoughtful  but inconclusive  discussion  of this  measurement  issue  is
found  in  Peter  S.  Heller  and  Alan  A. .ait,  Government  Employment  and
Pay:  Some  International  Comoarisons,  IMF,  Occasional  Paper  No. 24,
Washington,  D.C.,  1983.
i/ A comparative  discussion  of this  issue,  using  data  from  developed  and
developing  countries,  is  also  provided  by Heller  and  Tait,  op.  cit..-4-
workers  above  the  poverty  level  or to attract  and  retain  skilled
manpower. Real  remunerations  are  significantly  affected  by the
rate  of inflation  and  the  regularity  and  nature  of  salary
adjustments.  Declines  in  real  wages  are  often  cushioned  by
elaborate  allowances  or  non-wage  benefit  structures  that  in  some
countries  have  become  an increasingly  important  part  of the
overall  compensation  package. A pervasive  irony  afflicts  many
countries;  i.e.,  the  overall  salary  bill is  too  high  while  wages
are  too  low. This  dilemma  is  the  product  of years  of trade-offs,
given  fiscal  constraints,  in  favor  of  hiring  growing  numbers  of
employees  at  diminishing  salaries. Wage  erosion  is  particularly
a  problem  where  there  exists  an  alternative  market  for  public
servants,  either  through  a  better  paying  parastatal  sector,  a
domestic  private  sector  with  higher  salaries  and  benefits  or  an
international  market  to  which  highly  skilled  public  servants  may
migrate.
(iv) Wage  comgression.  In  many  of the  cases  under  examination,
increasing  compression  of the  ratio  of top  to  bottom  salaries  has
been identified  as a serious  constraint  on governments'  ability
to attract  and  retain  qualified  personnel  at the  middle  and
higher  levels. Wage  compression  is  partially  a function  of
expansive  employment  policies  as  discussed  above,  but in  some
countries  it  may  also  derive  from  regime  preferences  for
egalitarian  salary  structures.  This,  in turn,  may  hinge  on the
ideological  character  of the  regime  or the  degree  to  which  its
political  support  is  drawn  trom  the  lower  socioeconomic  strata. 4
B.  LENDING  INSTRUMENTS
The  Bank's  principal  instrument  for  promoting  public  employment
and  pay  reform  has  been  some  form  of  policy-based  lending,  principally
through  Structural  Adjustment  Loans. Between  1981  and  1987,  twenty-three
SALs  had public  employment  and  pay  components.  Conditionality  relating  to
public  employment  and  pay  was also  included  in  Reconstruction  Import
Credits  and  one  Imports  Program  Credit. Thirteen  Technical  Assistance
Loans  with  public  employment  and  pay  components  were  directly  linked  to
SALs. An additional  five  free-standing  TALs  also  included  significant
public  employment  and  pay  components.  (Table  6 classifies  pay  and
employment  operations  by region  and  lending  instrument.)
Bank  promotion  of  public  employment  and  pay  reforms  has  also
occurred  through  Country  Economic  and  Sector  Work. Some  of this  work  took
the  form  of sector  studies  in  anticipation  of  specific  Bank  projects  (e.g.,
diagnostic  studies  in  Mauritania  and  Senegal). Other  CESW  dealing  with
public  employment  and  pay issues  was  carried  out  through  the  preparation  of
country  economic  memoranda. In several  instances,  coverage  of these  issues
in  a Country  Economic  Memorandum  (CEM)  preceded  or  was  accompanied  by
i/ Recent  Bank  research  has  discussed  these  problems  for  African  cases.
See,  especially,  David  Lindauer,  Oey  Meesook,  and  Parita  Subsaeng,
Government  Wage  Policy  in  Africa: Summary  of  Findings  and  Policy
Issues,  CPD  Discussion  Paper  No. 1986-24,  April  1986.-5-
policy  dialogue  between  Bank  and  country  about  pay  and  employment  issues.
This  occurred,  for  example,  in  Thailand  and  Sri  Lanka. In the  latter,  such
dialogue  contributed  ultimately  to the  initiation  of a reform  process  and
iater  to the  initiation  of a  Bank-financed  (UNDP-executed)  Technical
Assistance  project.
Structural  Adjustment  Loans  varied  in the  depth  of their  treatment
of  public  employment  and  pay  issues. A few  SALs  merely  set  global
reduction  targets  (determined  in  collaboration  with the  IMF)  for  the
overall  wage  bill  without  specifying  a strategy  to reach  these  targets.
Sometimes  the  inclusion  in  a SAL  of such  conditions  was intended  to
encourage  the  continuation  of government  actions  already  taken.
In  most  cases,  however,  the  Bank  did  specify  the  means  by which
the  overall  wage  bill  might  be reduced. In these  cases,  conditionality  was
introduced  to restrain  salaries;  freeze  or reduce  employment;  carry  out
studies  on some  aspect  of  employment  and  pay  in  the  civil  service  or public
enterprise  sector;  or raise  civil  service  salaries. 5 (Table  7 shows  main
pay and  employment  components  for  Bank  operations.)
In  general,  TALs  took  a somewhat  different  approach  to  public
employment  and  pay issues,  often  providing  support  for  longer  term,  more
comprehensive  reform  efforts. Nine  TALs  sought  to strengthen  institutions
and  procedures  or to  collect  information  that  would  provide  the  foundation
for  more  radical  employment  and  pay  reforms  at som  later  date. As  might
be predicted,  TALs  that  were  closely  linked  to  SALs  provided  shorter  term
institutional  support  for  employment  and  pay  policy  conditionality  than  did
free-standing  Technical  Assistance  Projects  not  directly  connected  to the
structural  adjustment  process.
Although  central  government  (civil  service)  reform  was the
exclusive  focus  of  most  pay  and  employment  components  for  countries
surveyed,  approximately  11 operations  dealt  at least  peripherally  with  pay
and  employment  issues  in  public  enterprise  sectors. Turkey's  SALs  II-IV,
for  example,  were  aimed  primarily  at reforming  pay  and  employment
structures  in state  enterprises.  In general,  though,  most  of the  Bank
operations  surveyed  treated  public  enterprise  employment  issues  only
peripherally  as  an adjunct  to those  of central  government.  In  most
countries  examined,  state  enterprise  salaries  and  benefits  were  higher  than
those  of the  central  government  but lower  than  those  of the  private  sector.
(Costa  Rica  was a  notable  exception.)  Given  the  natural  drain  of skilled
civil  servants  to the  parastatal  sector,  the  principal  question  addressed
in  several  Bank interventions  was  whether  to  encourage  the  alignment  of
civil  service  and  state  enterprise  salary  and  benefit  systems  or to
separate  them,  allowing  state  enterprise  salary  structures  to  operate  more
autonomously,  thus  approaching  market  conditions.  One  Bank  operation
2/  It is  worth  noting  that  on occasion  the  IMF,  which  appears  generally  to
have  prescribed  wholesale  wage  reduction  without  significant  attention
to the  detailed  mechanisms  by which  this  reduction  might  take  place,
also  became  more involved  in  recommending  concrete  strategies  to  achieve
the  desired  objective. In  Guinea  and  the  Gambia,  for  example,  actual
employment  reduction  targets  and  timetables  were  set  as part  of  Fund
programs.- 6 -
recommended  the  alignment  of  civil  service  salary  scales  with those  in
State  enterprises,  and  six  operations  recommended  separating  them. 6
C.  OPERATIONAL  APPROACHES
Although  there  has  been  considerable  variation  from  one  reform
to another,  in general  the  substantive  approaches  to  pay  and  employment
issues  taken  in  Bank  operations  have tried  to  address  the  main  problems
outlined  above. The  Bank  has  sought  to  reduce  the  wage  bill,  lower  overall
employment  numbers,  promote  the  maintenance  of civil  service  salaries  at
levels  ensuring  the  availability  of  competent  government  workers,  and
decompress  salary  structures  so that  talented  managers  do not  leave  for
private,  parastatal,  or international  jobs.  In its  pay  and  employment
operations,  the  Bank  has  pursued  the  multiple,  sometimes  conflicting
objectives  of promoting  fiscal  constraint  and  improved  efficiency  in
central  government.
Salary  Restraint
The  most  sweeping  approach  taken  by the  Bank (and  the  Fund)  to
public  pay  and  salary  reforms  has  been to  call  for  a reduction  of the  wage
bill,  frequently  through  explicit  prescriptions  for  salary  restraint.
Three  Bank  operations  have  followed  this  approach,  usually  by recommending
an  across-the-board  freeze  in  public  sector  salaries. Eight  countries  have
taken  this  action  on their  own  or  with strong  urging  from  the  IMF.
Experience  with  wage  freezes  has  been  mixed. Some  countries  have frozen
wages  temporarily  but quickly  raised  them  when  the  immediate  pressure  was
relieved. Others  deferred  action  or indeed  were  unable  to  reduce  wages  at
all. Still  others  imposed  wage  freezes  that  were insufficiently  radical  to
effect  the  desired  total  wage  bill  reduction.  Despite  major  public  pay  and
imployment  reform  efforts  in  Senegal,  for  example,  structural  wage  drift
took  place,  nonetheless.  Although  a  wage freeze  was  enacted  in  1981,  the
overall  wage  bill  continued  to  increase  by about  7  percent  per  annum  in
real  terms  due  to  automatic  advancement  within  the  civil  service  and
consequent  pay increments.  Freezing  wages,  in  addition,  cuts  the  living
standards  of public  servants  and  tends  to  reinforce  the  erosion  of real
salaries  in  rapidly  inflating  economies. In  the  Central  African  Republic,
for  example,  public  servants'  purchasing  power  declined  so dramatically  as
a result  of successive  wage  freezes  between  1982  and  1985  that  the  urban
economy  of the  capital,  where  goxernment  employees  were  an important
consumer  block,  was adversely  affected. Finally,  across-the-board  freezes
lock  in  place  whatever  inequities  or  wage  compression  exist  within  the
salary  structure. 7
i/  For  a  more  thorough  review  of this  and  other  issues  related  to  pay  and
employment  in stete-owned  enterprises  in  Africa,  see  Sunita  Kikeri,
"Management  Compensation  Systems  for  Public  Enterprises  in Sub-Saharan
Africa," forthcoming,  1987.
1/  Depending  on the  extent  of  non-wage  benefits  in  the  compensation
package,  wage  freezes  may  affect  different  levels  of the  civil  service
differently.  Such  allowances  and  in-kind  benefits  constituted  from  10
to 70%  of compensation  in the  cases  examined.-7-
Enmloyment  Reforms
The  use of salary  restraint  to control  the  size  of the  global  wage
bill  evades  the  question  of the  number  of  civil  servants. Sometimes  this
number  is  so large  that  even  freezing  wages  does  little  to reduce
expenditure.  Though  wage  freezes  may  be politically  difficult  for
governments  to impose,  they  nonetheless  appear  to  be more  palatable  than
reducing  overall  public  sector  employment  itself. Hence  (as  discussed
earlier  in this  paper),  most  regimes  prefer  to  expand  employment  at
diminishing  wage  levels.
Nonetheless,  employment  was frozen  or  even  reduced  in  some  cases
examined. Four  countries  froze  employment,  and  in  the  case  of 5  more  the
Bank  urged  overall  employment  reductions.  Ten  countries  actually  succeeded
in cutting  employment  either  through  Bank  programs  or on their  own.
Employment  reform  methods  can  be located  along  a continuum  of
political  difficulty.  At the  low  difficulty  end  of this  continuum  is  one
of the  first  actions  usually  taken,  the  elimination  of ghosts. This  is
generally  accomplished  through  the  execution  of a  civil  service  census  and
the  computerization,  mechanization,  and  reconciliation  of  personnel
management  records  with  those  of the  payroll  (usually  situated  in the
Ministry  of  Finance). The  effort  to  eliminate  ghosts  was an important  part
of operations  in  3 countries.  Another  measure  incurring  only  moderate
political  cost  is the  elimination  of officially  sanctioned  posts  wihich  are
not  currently  filled. (This  occurred  in the  Gambia). Next,  temporary
workers  (to  whom  the  government  usually  has  fewer  legal  severance
obligations)  may  be retrenched,  as occurred  in  the  CAR  and  Jamaica  for
example. Several  countries  have  enforced  automatic  retirement  for  those
reaching  retirement  age  or the  requisite  years  of service. This  policy,
however,  has  not  been  without  problems. In  Senegal,  for  example,  where
official  retirement  came  between  ages  55  and  58 or 30  years  of service,
many  employees  retained  their  positions  by falsifying  records  to  conceal
their  true  age. The  degree  to  which  such  automatic  retirement  policies
have  a meaningful  effect  depends,  too,  on the  overall  age  structure  of the
civil  service  and  on the  pension  costs  generated  by automatic  retirement
programs. (In  most  African  countries,  the  age  distribution  is  skewed
toward  those  under  40  years  of  age.)
A freeze  on recruitment  is  often  the  next  step. Six  countries
imposed  recruitment  freezes. In the  CAR,  recruitment  was first  limited  by
a  rule  permitting  the  hiring  of  one  functionary  for  every  three  dismissed.
This  proved  expensive,  though,  because  it  became  commonplace  to  recruit  a
higher  level  staff  whenever  three  lower  level  ones  were  fired. The  system
was subsequently  modified  to  limit  recruitment  to a  ratio  of one  franc  of
hiring  for  every  three  francs  of savings.
Another  method  of freezing  recruitment  is  to  prevent  the
guaranteed  entry  of  recent  university  or  public  administration  school
graduates  to  the  civil  service. In some  cases,  entrance  into  the
university  itself  was  blocked. Such  steps  were  taken  by the  government  of
the  CAR  through  its  adjustment  program,  but students  and  recent  graduates
proved  a powerful  political  force. Although  guaranteed  access  to
government  was abolished,  many students  entered  government  service  as- 8 -
interns,  receiving  only  very  modest  subsistence  stipends. Although  they
were  not  hired  officially  as civil  servants,  many  of these  interns  were
able  to  position  themselves  to  be hired  subsequently  on  a permanent,  full-
salaried  basis.
A more  difficult  step,  both  politically  and  administratively,
is the  voluntary  retirement  of surplus  workers. This  is  currently  being
attempted  in  Guinea  under  a Bank  SAL. Because  voluntary  retirement  schemes
do  not  allow  the  government  control  over  which  employees  leave  or stay,
they  carry  the  risk  that  the  incompetent  will remain  and  the  more
enterprising  will leave.
The  actual  dismissal  of civil  servants  is  politically  the  most
difficult  step. Retrenchment,  nonetheless,  is taking  place  by various
mechanisms. In  Guinea  and  CAR,  justification  for  civil  service  cuts  has
been  based  on competence  testing  organized  by the  Ministry  of the  Civil
Service  but  carried  out  by each  individual  ministry. The  test  itself  has
provoked  angry  opposition.  In the  CAR,  a Canadian  consultant  working  with
the  Livestock  Ministry  to  develop  a competence  testing  methodology  was
attacked  in  his  home  by a  mob  of  civil  servants. (He  was  subsequently
provided  with a  bodyguard.)  The  exercise  was  only  completed  with  the
support  of the  Minister  of the  Civil  Service,  who  insisted  that  the  testing
program  continue  as planned. Despite  these  difficulties,  however,  such
testing  schemes,  like  the  functional  reviews  to  be discussed  shortly,  may
provide  the  necessary  technical  rationale  for  dismissals  and  thus  help
reduce  the  possibilities  of retrenchments  based  on arbitrary  criteria. In
the  Gambia,  where  such  testing  has  not  taken  place,  Bank  staff  expressed
some  fears  - which  apparently  proved  not  to  be realized  - that  employment
cuts  might  be  based  more  on tribal  or  political  considerations  than  on
purely  functional  requirements.  Still,  such  testing  schemes  have  yet  to  be
carried  out  on a  wide scale.
The  economic  and  political  feasibility  of  employment  cuts  may
depend  on the  degree  to  which  civil  servants  are  currently  benefitting  from
government  jobs  and  on the  alternatives  available  to them  outside  the  state
sector. If  most  government  employees  are  currently  engaged  in  moonlighting
activities  providing  significant  supplementary  income,  the  adjustment  to
retrenchment  will  be easier. If,  on the  other  hand,  access  to  other  legal
or illicit  forms  of income  depends  upon  government  positions,  or if the
status  acquired  through  those  positions  is  esteemed  for  its  own  sake,  then
the  individual  costs  of retrenchment  and  the  political  costs  to  government
both  rise. On this  dimension  Senegal,  where  non-salary  allowances  and
political  influence  figure  importantly  in  the  attractiveness  of civil
service  positions,  appears  to fall  in  the "high  risk"  category. In  Guinea,
on the  other  hand,  Bank  staff  report  that  despite  the  very  high  level  of
government  employment  in  the  capital  of Conakry  (an  estimate  95%  of  modern
sector  employment  is in the  state  sector),  public  employment  reduction  may
be facilitated  because  civil  service  salaries  sank  so low  that  they  became
a relatively  minor  portion  of  most  individuals'  total  income. Even  non-
wage  compensation  such  as rice  rations  became  so insignificant  that  they
lost  their  attraction  for  many  government  employees.
The  political  costs  of retrenchments  may also  be  mitigated  by
"public  education"  programs. In  Guinea,  French  technical  assistancefinanced  a  public  relations  consultant  who  prepared  an information  campaign
(through  radio  and  television  broadcasts)  that  publicized  and  explained  the
government's  retrenchment  plan. Bank  staff  observ'ng  the  effects  of this
program  were  persuaded  that  it led  to increased  public  acceptance  of
employment  reductions.
Severance  and  Redeglovment
Severance  and  redeployment  arrangements  for  redundant  employees
are  an important  aspect  of  retrenchment  policies. So far,  the  Bank  has
limited  its  direct  involvement  in  this  area  to  policy  discussions  with
governments  contemplating  sevsrance  and  redeployment  schemes. For  the  most
part,  these  discussions  have *aised  more  questions  than  answers. Most
countries  have legal  regulatory  frameworks  binding  them  to a  particular
level  of  payments. The  degree  to  which  these  legalities  can  be ignored
or  modified  depends  largely  on the  nature  of the  political  system.
Governments  face  difficult  choices  in  weighing  the  political  and  economic
costs  of severance  policies. In  Guyana,  for  example,  a 24%  reduction  in
the  public  service  in  1981-82  made 13,000  workers  redundant  in  both the
civil  service  and  public  enterprises.  Due  to  the  heavy  burden  of severance
payments  to  fired  individuals,  these  employment  reductions  had  considerably
less  salutory  effect  on the  wage  bill than  had  been  hoped. Based  on  years
served,  aggregate  severance  payments  actually  increased  the  wage  bill for
several  years. Under  strong  pressure  from  labor  unions,  the  government  was
forced  to  borrow  to  pay  off  workers,  and  in  1985  debt  service  reached  an
unprecedented  65%  of expenditures.
Whether  to  pay  redundant  civil  servants  a lump  sum  or to defer
payments  over  a  phased  period  is  also  an open  question. Deferred  plans  may
benefit  governments,  because  they  typically  take  advantage  of currency
erosion  through  inflation  and  earn  interest  on the  yet-to-be-disbursed
funds. Such  plans  may  benefit  employees  as  well,  in  so far  as the
potential  dissipation  of a one-time  lump  sum  payment  is  less  of a danger.
In  Guinea,  a three  option  plan  is  being  proposed. Voluntary  retirees  may
draw  a salary  with  accompanying  rice  rations  for  60  months,  take  40  percent
in  cash  and  the  rest  in regular  salary  payments,  or they  may take  a share
of the  severance  allowance  as a down  payment  on a  new  business  enterprise.
Lines  of credit  to  promote  entrepreneurs  in  the  private  sector  have  also
been  discussed  in the  Gambia  and  Ghana.
Although  public  enterprises  are  not the  central  concern  of this
review,  one  interesting  experience  with  compensation  and  severance  is  the
case  of the  Cocoa  Marketing  Board  (COCOBOD)  in  Ghana,  an experience  which
may  provide  lessons  for  similar  severance  exercises  now  being  contemplated
for  Ghana's  civil  service. COCOBOD  recently  laid  off  approximately  16,000
workers  in  1986  at an  overall  cost (over  a three-year  period)  of  US
$20  million. This  constituted  an average  individual  payment  of 11  years  of
base salary  (which,  in  fact,  only  made  up 50%  of total  compensation).
Although  COCOBOD  felt  itself  bound  by existing  labor  agreements  to  honor
this  arrangement  in  a one-time  up front  payment,  the  President,  alarmed  by
the  cost,  intervened  to insist  on a  deferred  payment  scheme  over  three
years. The  first  third  of the  settlement  would  be  paid  up front;  the
second  third  would  be paid  one  year  later  (with  interest  accruing  to
government);  and  the  third  would  be paid in  the  third  year. With inflation- 10  -
and  foregone  interest,  the  payments  thus  amounted  to  approximately  four  and
a  half  years'  salary  equivalent.  The  thrust  (though  not  the  specifics)  of
this  arrangement  was  part  of the  Bank's  conditionality  for  its  Export
Rehabilitation  Project. The  cut  of 16,000 was  made  on an overall
estimated  staff  of 80,000  after  a functional  review  carried  out  by the
COCOBOD  directorate  with  the  assistance  of expatriate  consultants  financed
through  the  Technical  Assistance  Credit. 8 Bank  staff  interviewed  about  this
action  were  convinced  that  the  reductions  would  never  have  taken  place
without  outside  assistance,  as much  for  the  active  role  the  consultants
took  in  negotiating  the  plan  with  the  various  interested  parties  as for
their  actual  expertise  in  helping  to  design  it.
Aside  from  indirect  attention  to  severance  payments,  the  question
of redeployment  of redundant  employees  has  not really  been addressed  by the
Bank  or  even,  for  the  most  part,  by the  countries  themselves.  Ghanaians
have discussed  incentive  plans  to  encourage  redundant  employees  to take  up
productive  agricultural  activities.  In  Guinea,  some  discussion  has
focussed  on the  possibility  of  short-term  labor-intensive  public  work
projects,  but  no action  has  been  taken. In  the  Gambia,  lines  of credit  in
combination  with  training  for  entrepreneurs  have  also  been  discussed.  The
Bank's  involvement  in  redeployment  has gone  furthest  in  Bolivia,  where  the
possibility  of financing  severance  payments  and  an  ambitious  public  works
program  for  redundant  miners  (laid  off  from  the  country's  state-owned  tin
enterprise)  has  been  proposed. Such  financing  might  be channeled  through  a
national  social  emergency  fund,  assisted  by a free-standing  Bank  social
adjustment  project.
Changes  in  the  Salary  Structure
The  Bank  has  recommended  selective  upward  adjustments  in  public
sector  salaries  in 5  countries. In  many  countries,  public  sector  salaries
have eroded  in  comparison  with increases  in  the  consumer  price  index. This
erosion  was  damaging  for  all  grades  of the  civil  service,  but it  was
particularly  insidious  at the  higher  levels,  especially  when  compared  to
wages  commanded  by managerial  personnel  in  the  private  sector  or in  some
cases  with the  parastatal  sector  (where  perks  and  wages  were  better  than
those  offered  by the  central  government).  The  result  was the  increasing
compression  of the  ratio  between  top  and  bottom  grade  salaries,  resulting
in  demoralization,  corruption,  moonlighting,  and,  where  alternatives
existed,  the  flight  of top  and  middle-level  management  from  government
posts. Although  in  some  cases  modest  wage increases  had  taken  place  in the
past,  they  were  mostly  instituted  across  the  grade  spectrum  or  were  more
generous  to lower  echelon  personnel. In  Jamaica,  for  example,  the  Consumer
Price  Index  rose  by over  450%  for  the  period  between  1972  to 1982,  while
salaries  for  the  three  highest  professional  grades  were increased  between
40%  and  85%. A simultaneous  increase  of over  350%  for  government-employed
casual  labor  reflected  official  policy  of  upgrading  salaries  at the  lower
end  of the  scale  at the  expense  of  higher  level  staff. The  awarding  of
flat,  across-the-board  pay increases  resulted  in  dramatic  salary
compression  and  a large  exodus  of skilled  and  experienced  professionals
from  the  civil  service  and,  frequently,  from  the  country  itself. This
j/ The  consultants  had  been financed  originally  for  other  activities  but
were  co-opted  into  working  on this  problem.- 11  -
emigration  translated  into  high  vacancy  levels  in  key  ministerial  posts.
For  instance,  one  line  agency  reported  a 57%  vacancy  rate  in these  posts,
and  an  average  of 47%  of top  positions  in  core  agencies  were  vacant. Often
the  remaining  positions  were filled  with  marginally  qualified  staff. One
consequence  of this  salary  restraint  was  the  rapid  growth  in the  creation
of  parastatals  (which  could  pay  above  civil  service  scales)  to  carry  out
key government  tasks. Parastatals  took  over  core  activities  in  areas  such
as  public  works,  statistics,  and  even  national  planning.
The  record  of the  Bank  in  pushing  for  selective  wage increases  to
decompress  wage  structures  and  make  the  civil  service  more  attractive  to
skilled  manpower  has  been  mixed. In  Bangladesh  and  Peru,  efforts  to
increase  wages,  with  particular  emphasis  on  higher  level  staff,  were
largely  unsuccessful.  In Bangladesh,  wages  were raised,  but lower  echelon
staff  received  a 100%  increase  while  higher  level  personnel  received  only  a
50%  increase  and  a  reduction  in  non-wage  allowances.  Bank  staff
interviewed  stressed  the  need  to  press  for  greater  reform  through
continuing  dialogue  with  the  government  in  order  to  bring  about  more
fundamental  change. In  Peru,  public  pressure  to  keep  the  salary  scale  flat
was  heeded  by a  newly  elected  populist  regime. In  Ghana,  salaries  were
raised,  and the  overall  pay  structure  was  decompressed  from  a top  to  bottom
level  ratio  of 2:1  to 5.6:1  during  policy  dialogue  in  preparation  for  the
SAL  and  companion  technical  assistance  project. Although  the  Bank  had
recommended  that  this  decompression  occur  without  growth  in the  overall
wage  bill,  several  miscalculations  on the  part  of government  resulted  in  a
wage  bill increase. In the  case  of Sri  Lanka,  policy  dialogue  in  the
context  of Country  Economic  and  Sector  Work  and  as  a transition  to  T.A.
project  preparation  between  government  and  the  Bank  led  to  a decompression
of top  to  bottom  salaries  from  4.2:1  in  1984  to 11.8:1  as of  May 1986.
Finally,  in  Jamaica,  the  Bank  encouraged  the  government  to  raise  high-level
professional  grade  salaries  in  the  civil  service  to 85%  of those  in the
public  enterprise  sector  in  order  to  attract  and  retain  quality  skilled
personnel. The  plan  was  to  achieve  this  increase  over  a three-year  period
as  part of the  conditionality  of SAL  III. Although  one  incremental
increase  was  effected  in  1984  just  before  the  SAL  was  approved,  a second
adjustment  did  not  take  place  until  late  1986. Even  with this  second
increase,  higher  management  Civil  Service  salary  levels  still  fall  far
short  of 85%  of parastatal  remuneration  for  most  job  categories,  however,
and  Bank  staff  have  expressed  concern  that  Government  may  not  implement  the
third  round of promised  adjustments  due  to  political  factors. These
delays  in  following  through  with this  reform  reflected  heavy  pressure  on
government  to  pursue  egalitarian  employment  policies  and  only  superficial
government  commitment  to the  proposed  raises. It  has  also  been suggested
that  the  government's  efforts  to improve  the  lot  of  higher  level  civil
servants  were  constrained  in the  wake  of its  bold  redundancy  actions  taken
under  the  Fund  stablization  program. Approximately  20,000  government
employees  were  dismissed  during  the  1984-85  period  - precisely  when  the
second  salary  increase  for  managers  was supposed  to take  place.
Non-Wage  Mechanisms  for  Attracting  and  Retaining  High-Level  Personnel
Compressed  salaries  and  deteriorating  working  conditions  have  made
it  difficult  to  attract  and  retain  high level  professionals  in  the  civil- 12 -
service  and  to  keep  those  who  remain  honest  and  hardworking.  While  salary
decompression  is  one  approach  to this  dilemma,  continuing  fiscal  crises  and
political  constraints  may  make  more  steeply  graded  civil  service  structures
infeasible.  Alternative  solutions  have  been  proposed  and  attempted  in
several  cases. One  of these  is the  notion  of a senior  executive  service  or
corps.  Modeled  after  the  SES  introduced  in the  United  States  in 1979,  this
is  a category  of super-grade  upper  management  government  employees  who  are
paid  salaries  above  thr  highest  level  of the  civil  service. In return  for
enhanced  financial  remuneration,  they  give  up job  security. 9 The
possibility  of instituting  a  modified  version  of SES  has  been  discussed  in
Ghana,  and  it  was  proposed  as a component  of the  Public  Sector  Management
Technical  Assistance  Project  in  Peru. In the  Peruvian  case,  government
resistance  prevented  the  implementation  of SES  after  loan  approval. It  was
to  have  been  financed  by a  Bank-supported  Foundation  for  the  Development  of
the  Public  Sector,  which  would  have  guaranteed  salaries  above  the  civil
service  scale  that  were  more  competitive  with the  public  enterprise  sector
and  closer  to  the  private  sector. The  establishment  of the  Foundation  was
a condition  of loan  effectiveness.  A contractual  arrangement  between  the
Foundation  and  Government  to  ensure  the  execution  of the  SES  was  a
condition  of disbursement,  but  neither  was  ever  fully  activated.  Within
other  parts  of government,  the  fear  that  the  Foundation  and  SES  would  be
dominated  by the  ruling  elite  and  that  the  Foundation  would  become  a slush
fund  for  overpaid  consultants  raised  insuperable  opposition  to the  SES-
Foundation  proposition.  The  fate  of the  proposal  was sealed  when a left-
leaning,  urban-based  populist  party  came  to  power  criticizing  the  elitism
and  corruption  of the  previous  regime.
Other  mechanisms  for  attracting  qualified  professionals
to  government  service  Include  local  consultancies  and  secondment  from  more
remunerative  parts  of  government,  usually  the  publ'z  enterprise  sector. In
Ghana,  an innovative  special  skills  mobilization  scheme  to facilitate  the
use  of local  consultants  to  fill  critical  government  vacancies  at topped-up
salaries  is  being  financed  through  a Technical  Assistance  Project. On an
ad  hoc  basis,  secondment  has  frequently  been  used  to  attract  qualified
professionals  to  central  government  at salaries  above  civil  service  levels.
Another  feature  of  many  public  compensation  structures  that
ameliorates  salary  erosion  and  compression  is the  non-wage  allowance  and
benefit  system. For  many  civil  servants,  wages  may  constitute  as lit.le  as
25%  of the  total  compensation  package. Non-wage  benefits  may include
housing  or  housing  allowances,  family  and  health  benefits,  and  pension
plans. In some  countries,  (e.g.,  Senegal)  premiums  are  paid for  each
individual  job  category,  often  without  clear  functional  justification.l 0 In
Sri  Lanka,  an "exodus"  allowance  is  paid  to  professionals  who, it is
feared,  might  be lured  away  by the  international  market. In  both  Senegal
and  Sri  Lanka,  as in  other  countries,  the  allowance  system  is complicated
2/  For  an analysis  of the  United  States  experience,  see,  Robert  W. Hartman
and  Arnold  R. Weber,  The  Rewards  of Public  Service:  Compensating  Top
Federal  Officials,  Brookings  Institution,  Washington,  D.C.  1980.
I/  See  Peter  C.  Bloch,  "Wage  Policy,  Wage  Structure  and  Employment  in the
Public  Sector  of Senegal,"  CPD  Discussion  Paper,  No.  1985-41,  May,
1985"  for  a thorough  treatment  of non-wage  benefits  in Senegal.- 13 -
and  unevenly  distributed,  causing  resentment  among  less  favored  civil
servants. To the  extent  that  they  moderate  the  effect  of salary  erosion,
however,  allowances  may, in  the  short  term,  be a  necessary  evil.  In  any
case,  allowances  are  a  big,  permanent  part  of the  pay  system  in  many
countries  and  it is  misleading  not  to  take  them  into  account. Although
some  research  has  been  carried  out  in  the  Bank  exploring  various  facets  of
non-wage  benefit  systems,  Bank  operational  work  has generally  paid  only
minimal  attention  to this  issue.
The  degree  to  which  any  of the  above  mechanisms  can  attract  and
keep  higher  level  personnel  in  government  depends  largely  on the  available
alternatives.  In  Guyana  where  professionals  may  make  one-fourth  the
salaries  of their  counterparts  in  neighboring  countries,  the  prospects  for
attracting  qualified  high-level  personnel  are  dismal,  especially  given  the
weak  state  of the  economy. In  other  countries,  however,  non-material
incentives  such  as  prestige,  patriotism,  or access  to  social  and  political
connections  may  motivate  well-qualified  individuals  to take  low-paying  jobs
in  government,  assuming  minimally  acceptable  conditions  for  subsistence.
D.  OPERATIONAL  TECHNIQUES
This  section  delineates  the  main  techniques  used  in  Bank
operations  to  carry  out  the  substantive  approaches  discussed  above.  (As  a
reminder,  this  discussion  includes  initiatives  that  may  or  may  not  have
been  directly  in  a Bank  program. Some  activities  discussed  were the  result
of government  action  (some  with IMF  support)  and  thus  may  have  precedod  and
perhaps  laid  the  foundation  for  the  Bank's  operational  intervention.)
PreXeauisites  to  Reform: Data  Collection.  CoMnuterization.  Civil  Service
Census,  Functional  Review
Some  Bank  operational  activities  are  prerequisites  to further
reforms. These  are  usually  related  to the  need to  collect  and  access
necessary  information  to  get  control  of the  personnel  system. They  include
data  collection  and  information  management  system  improvements,  civil
service  censuses,  functional  reviews  of  whole  governments  or  selected
ministries,  diagnostic  studies  of overall  employment  problems,  and  other
specific  aspects  of employment  and  pay  policy.
Civil  Service  Censuses
Civil  service  censuses  are  often  viewed  as  a preliminary  step  to
generating  information  crucial  to  making  necessary  changes  in  public
employment  and  pay  policy. Such  surveys  have  been  carried  out  in  6
countries  where  the  Bank  has  been  active  in  pay  and  employment  reform.
They  are  intended  as a  head  count  of  civil  servants  actually  working  in
government.  They  should  be able,  in  principle,  to distinguish  those  actual
employees  from  fictitious  or fraudulent  names  (ghosts)  on the  staffing
lists  of the  civil  service  ministry  or the  individual  technical  ministries.
This  can  be achieved  by comparing  the  results  of the  census  with  the
payroll. In 3  cases,  this  comparison  was  made  and  ghosts  were  eliminated.
Such  follow-up  comparisons  are  not  always  performed,  however,  calling  the
usefulness  of the  census  itself  into  question. Civil  service  censuses  have
generally  been  carried  out  by government  functionaries,  often  teamed  with- 14 -
local  consultants.  They  are  frequently  undertaken  under  difficult
conditions  and  tend  to  use  no standardized  methodology.  On average,
censuses  take  several  months  to  complete,  but  the  time  required  to  carry
them  out  varies  with  the  skill  of the  investigators,  the  size  of the  team,
and  the  size  of the  civil  service. Civil  service  censuses  are  vulnerable
to fraud;  investigators  may  be subject  to  pressures  or  payments  from
interested  parties,  or they  may  fall  victim  to  strong  inclinations  to
finesse  already  existing  staffing  lists  rather  than  taking  the  trouble  to
collect  clean  information.  Still,  in  countries  where  virtually  nothing  is
known  about  actual  numbers  of  public  and/or  civil  servants,  sometimes  even
partial  data  gathered  through  a census  may  provide  a starting  point  for
policy  reform  efforts.
Functional  Reviews
Functional  reviews  of the  public  administration  constitute  another
prerequisite  to  pay  and  employment  reform. Such  reviews  examine  the
functional  staffing  requirements  of government  on a  min 4stry  by ministry
basis,  matching  tasks  with  objectives  and  identifying  the  number  and  type
of staff  necessary  to  carry  out  these  essential  activities  as compared  to
the  established  or authorized  positions,  and  to those  officials  actually  in
post.  Thus,  staff  surpluses  and  shortfalls  can  be identified  on  a
technical  basis,  and,  in theory,  redundancies  can  be eliminated.  Such  a
review  was  executed  in  the  Gambia  with  bi-lateral  assistance  in support  of
both  a Fund  program  and  a Bank  Structural  Adjustment  Credit  and  was the
basis  for  a large-scale  staff  reduction  carried  out  in 1986  and  1987. In
Senegal,  the  Bureau  of Organization  and  Methods  (BOM)of  the  Office  of the
President  has  attempted  to  carry  out  such  a  review,  but few  ministries  have
cooperated  in this  process. A functional  review  has also  been suggested  by
the  Bank  to carry  forward  employment  and  pay reforms  in  Ghana,  and  is  being
financed  by the  recently  approved  Structural  Adjustment  Institutional
Support  Project. In  addition,  several  national  civil  service  commissions
have  carried  out  similar  exercises  on their  own.
As the  basis  for  public  pay  and  employment  reform,  functional
reviews  provide  technical  guidance  to  policy  makers  as to  where,  if
necessary,  changes  can  and  should  be made  in  the  employment  structure.  To
the  extent  that  they  have such  management  decision  uses,  functional  reviews
thus  constitute  a  more  sophisticated  tool  than  civil  service  censuses
(which  provide  only  raw  numbers). They  also  supply  a credible,  technical
rationale  for  the  difficult,  political  decision  of employment  reduction.  A
few  prominent  consulting  firms  have  developed  functional  review
methodologies  that  borrow  heavily  from  work  carried  out in  advanced
industrial  countries. Concerns  have  been  expressed  that  these  reviews  are
expensive  and  time-consuming  (in  the  Gambia  a three-person  team  took  six
months  to  review  a  civil  service  of approximately  15,000). Given  delicate
political  circumstances,  personnel  reduction  reforms  may  be more  successful
if  they  are  carried  out  swiftly,  so some  countries  may  be unable  to  wait
for  the  completion  of  a detailed  functional  review  before  taking  action.
In  addition,  questions  have  been  raised  about  the  propriety  and  difficulty
of expatriate  consulting  firms  carrying  out  such  delicate  reviews. In
Ghana,  for  example,  government  officials  were  reportedly  uncomfortable  with
this  prospect. In Senegal,  the  resistance  of  various  ministries  to- 15 -
submitting  to this  type  of review  underscores  the  sensitivity  of the
exercise.
Data  Collection  and  Computerization  of  Personnel  Management  Functions
For  most  countries  surveyed,  data  about  employment  numbers  and
structure,  pay  and  non-wage  compensation  systems,  and  career  promotion
patterns  are  often  unavailable,  inaccessible  or unreliable.  Frequently,
only  rough  estimates  can  be obtained  for  numbers  of civil  service
employees. Still  less  is  known  by central  governments  about  employment
numbers  in  the  public  enterprise  sector  as a  whole.  (Even  where  the  Bank
has tied  SAL  conditionality  to  employment  reductions,  as in  Costa  Rica,
data  were  reported  to  be very  approximate  for  the  civil  service  and  not
available at all  for  the  public  enterprises.)  In  some  countries,  such  as
Senegal,  data  on  pay systems  are  incomplete  due  to the  absence  of adequate
information  about  the  elaborate  non-wage  allowance  system. Some  data
problems  stem  from  the  reluctance  of governments  to surrender  to the  Bank
sensitive  information  about  employment  and  pay.  But  in  general,
governments  themselves  are  unable  to  access  information  within  their  own
personnel  management  systems,  many  of  which  are  still  administered
manually. In some  instances,  the  mechanized  payroll  records  are  not linked
to  personnel  recruitment  records  kept in  the  civil  service  ministry. This
is  one  reason  why there  are  phantom  employees  receiving  paychecks. Thus
several  Bank  operations,  such  as those  in  Mauritania,  Ghana  and the  Central
African  Republic,  have  financed  the  computerization  of the  personnel
management  system  and  the  reconciliation  of  personnel  records  with those  of
the  payroll. For  several  countries  where  ghost  elimination  has  been
significant,  mechanization  and  reconciliation  of  payroll  appears  to  have
been crucial. Moreover,  the  usefulness  of censuses  in  ghost  elimination  is
enhanced  by subsequent  payroll  and  personnel  record  automation.
Diagnostics  and  Studies
In an  attempt  to fill  the  data  gaps  discussed  above,  the  Bank  has
financed  studies  of  various  aspects  of employment  and  pay  issues. Through
its  sector  work,  the  Bank  has also  conducted  diagnostic  studies  of  various
issues  in  public  administration,  with  attention  to  public  pay  and
employment  questions,  as part  of project  preparation  for  several  T.A.
projects. Two  such  studies  were  carried  out  in  Mauritania  and  Senegal.
The  Mauritania  diagnostic  was reportedly  useful  in  gathering  essential
information  about  the  personnel  system  as  well  as in  facilitating  Bank-
government  communications  in this  area. In Senegal,  initial  ambiguity
about  the  purpose  of the  Bank's  diagnostic  work  caused  the  government  some
concern  at first,  but the  information  gathered  helped  lay  a more  solid
foundation  for  the  preparation  of a  Development  Management  Technical
Assistance  Project  and  helped  broaden  government  views  on  key issues. The
degree  to  which  such  diagnostic  tools  may  be useful  in  preparing  and  in
building  country  support  for  operational  activities  is  worth  further
exploration.
Institutional  Arrangements
The  institutional  arrangements  under  which  pay  and  employment
reform  takes  place  influence  its  outcome. In  a  number  of countries,  reform- 16 -
begins  with the  formation  of a  high-level  interministerial  commission  or
task  force  examining  questions  of  pay  and  employment,  often  within  the
context  of larger  organizational  issues  in the  public  administration.
(Zambia,  Malawi,  Bangladesh,  Senegal,  Sri  Lanka,  CAR,  and  Ghana,  among
others,  all  had  such  commissions.)  These  commissions  may  issue  reports  and
organize  or oversee  civil  service  reform. They  may  be short-lived,  as in
Bangladesh,  or  become  more  fully  institutionalized,  as in  Senegal. They
may  or  may  not  offer  remuneration  to their  members. The  nature  of these
commissions  and  their  impact  on  reform  varies. In Bangladesh  a  national
pay  commission  meets  regularly  to  review  salary  policy  and in  1983,  a
public  administration  commission,  (ENAM)  reorganized  the  public  service  and
instituted  a far-reaching  decentralization  program;  another  high-level
committee  is  now  about  to  review  the  functions  and  effectiveness  of the
management  and  professional  levels  of the  public  service. In Sri  Lanka  the
National  Salary  Commission,  a standing  body,  substantially  raised  salaries
for  higher  level  staff,  prodded  by a Special  Presidential  Administrative
Reforms  Committee.
The  actual  implementation  of  employment  and  pay  policy  reform
takes place  in a  wide  variety  of settings  within  governments.  More  often
than  not,  personnel  management  and  pay functions  are  divided  between  the
Ministry  of the  Civil  Service  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance. Personnel
management  functions  are  also  carried  out in  the  personnel  branches  of
technical  ministries  as  well  as in  local  decentralized  units  of government.
Coordination  and  reconciliation  of procedures  as  well  as records  is
required  among  these  various  agencies. In  some  cases,  an additional  entity
to  carry  out  system-wide  reforms  is  grafted  onto  one  of these  or is
attached  to the  president's  or  prime  minister's  office. (Examples  of these
reform  entities  are  found  in  Mali,  Mauritania,  Central  African  Republic,
Guinea,  and  Senegal,  among  others.) They  are  sometimes  staffed  with
expatriate  consultants,  as in  the  case  of a Bank-UNDP,  co-financed
administrative  reform  project  in  Mali.  In Senegal,  the  institutional
proliferation  of  agencies  making  policy  on employment  and  pay issues  has
produced  poorly  coordinated  decisions  and  contradictory  staff  rules. Past
efforts  at reform  have  also  been  ineffective,  partly  because  they  have
consistently  come  from  central  agencies  outside  the  technical  ministries. 11
Nonetheless,  reform  efforts  located  in  more  autonomous  institutions  with
greater  access  to  higher  levels  of government  generally  have  a  better
chance  of succeeding.  In the  Central  African  Republic,  for  example,  the
National  Commission  for  Administrative  Reform  was  first  placed  under  the
Ministry  of the  Civil  Service  which  lacked  the  political  influence  and
independence  to  carry  out  the  difficult  choices  involved  in  making
employment  cuts. The  Commission  was subsequently  moved  to the  Office  of
the  President  to afford  the  reform  progrem  greater  legitimacy  and  political
leverage.
_j/  John  Nellis,  An Assessment  of the  Senegalese  Administrative  System,
WA2DB  Working  Paper/Reports  No.  7, September  11,  1986.- 17 -
III.  ANALYSIS OF PAY AND EMPLOYMENT IN BANK RESEARCH AND CESW
A.  COUNTRY ECONOMIC AND SECTOR WORK
The  increased  attention  being  given  to  public  pay  and  employment
issues  is reflected  in  the  expanding  body of  Bank  Research  and  Country
Economic  and  Sector  Work focusing  on these  issues. In the  period  under
review,  Country  Economic  memoranda  have  increasingly  treated  pay and
employment  issues  at length. For  most  countries,  attention  to  pay  and
employment  in  the  CEM  preceded  subsequent  Bank  operational  work.  In
Senegal,  for  example,  the  1984  CEM  identified  overextension  of the  public
sector  as one  of four  main  problems  affecting  the  country's  development.
The  report  also  underscored  the  need  to  control  the  growth  of public
expenditures.  Additional  sector  work,  including  analysis  of pay  and
employment  issues,  followed  and  led  to  the  preparation  of  a freestanding
Development  Management  Technical  Assistance  Project  to provide  medium-term
support  to  strengthen  institutions  for  personnel  management. 12 The  1985
Gambia  CEM  recommended  employment  reductions  and the  restraint  of aggregate
wage expenditures.  These  recommendations  were incorporated  into
operational  activities  through  the  1986  SAL.
In  some  countries,  CEMs  themselves  have constituted  the  Bank's
principal  operational  work.  In  Thailand,  for  example,  aside  from  a small
compensation  study  financed  through  the  SAL,  the  1986  CEM  was  the  main
vehicle  for  Bank-country  policy  dialogue  focusing  on employment  and  pay
issues. In  Bangladesh,  recommendations  made  in the  1985  CEM  with  regard  to
pay  and  employment  also  formed  the  basis  for  policy  dialogue  between  the
Bank  and  Government,  though  these  issues  will  recur  in  the  work  of an
Administrative  Reforms  Committee  set  up under  the  13th  Import  Program
Credit. In Sri  Lanka,  some  recommendations  made in the  1986  CEM  suggesting
revisions  in the  salary  structure  have  been  adopted  by Government,  and  the
analysis  and  recommendations  of the  report  on future  civil  service  salary
and  employment  policy  by the  Presidential  Reform  Committee  largely  coincide
with those  of the  CEM.  Indeed,  in  countries  where  national  skill  levels
are  high  and  autonomy  from  Bank  leverage  is  considerable,  some  Bank  staff
contend  that  ongoing  sector  work  is the  most  influential  instrument  of  Bank
intervention.  This  is  so,  it is  suggested,  as long  as it  can  be clearly
demonstrated  that  the  Bank's  professional  contribution  is  unique  and  of
superior  quality.
Even  where  CESW  has  not  led  directly  to lending,  its  impact  has
been felt. For  example,  the  Indonesia  Management  DeveloRment  ReRort's
recommendation  that  in-kind  payments  be integrated  into  the  basic  salary
structure  of the  Indonesian  Civil  Service  was  subsequently  adopted  by
Government.
B.  BANK  AND  IMF  RESEARCH
There  has  also  been  a  growing  research  effort  within  the  Bank
examining  public  employment  and  pay  issues. (See  attached  bibliography  for
D1/  Additional  sector  work included:  John  Nellis,  An Assessment  of the
Senegalese  Administrative  System,  WA2DB  Working  Paper/Reports  No. 7,
September  11,  1986.- 18 -
a complete  list  of this  research.) Most  of the  work  focused  on  Africa  and
was  embodied  in  a research  program  undertaken  in  CPD. This  project
produced  country-specific  papers  reviewing  pay  and  employment  policy  in
Sudan,  Zambia,  Senegal,  Nigeria,  and  Liberia. In  addition,  several
overview  papers  analyzed  those  countries  as  well  as additional  public
sector  wage and  employment  data  for  Ghana,  Uganda,  Kenya,  Malawi  and
Tanzania.13
The  main  sources  of  data  for  this  research  consisted  of personnel
divisions  of technical  ministries,  civil  service  commissions,  finance  and
civil  service  ministries,  and,  at times,  private  sector  surveys  carried  out
by individual  commercial  enterprises.  Data  were thought  to  be best  for
Zambia  and  worst  for  Uganda. In  general,  the  research  stresses  the
diversity  of employment  and  pay  conditions  in  Africa. It does,  however,
report  a  number  of general  trends: extreme  wage erosion  due  to infrequent
sala'y  adjustments  and  rapid  price  increases;  increasing  relative
importance  of non-wage  benefits;  increasing  wage compression;and  rapid
expansion  in  government  employment  as  a whole. The  basic  policy
recommendation  emerging  from  this  work is  that  employment  expansion  should
not  be traded  off  against  higher  wages. Smaller,  more  productive  civil
services  should  be the  objective.  With  regard  to the  public  enterprise
sector,  Lindauer  et  al.,  argued  for  the  separation  of public  enterprise  and
civil  service  salary  scales.
Several  other  studies  recently  carvied  out  in  the  Bank  have
examined  pay  and  employment  issues. A.R.  Xhan's  "Liberia  SAL: Wages  and
Employment  in  the  Public  Sector"  and  "Employment  and  Wages  in  Liberia,  Some
Preliminary  Notes  with  Special  Reference  to the  Public  Sector"  analyze
growth  in  public  sector  employment  wages,  their  impact  on the  wage  bill,
and  wage  compression.  They  present  alternative  instruments  for  the
attainment  of target  reductions  in the  wage  bill,  including  reductions  of
the  rate  of salary  increase,  postponements  of increments  and  promotions,
and  overall  reductions  in  employment.  Other  studies  on this  issue  include
Sunita  Kikeri,  "Compensation  Systems  for  Public  Enterprise  Managers  in
Africa"  (1987)  and  Peter  Heller  and  Alan  Tait,  "Government  Emplayment  and
Pay:  Some  International  Comparisons,"  which  was  carried  out  by the  IMF's
Fiscal  Affairs  Division. The  former  looks  at  comparison  schemes  and
performance  criteria  in  public  enterprises  in  Africa;  the  latter  examines
comparative  data  for  public  sector  employment  and  suggests  ways to  measure
and  evaluate  them.  In  addition,  a recent  paper  by Ruth  Klinov,  "Public-
Sector  Wages  and  Employment  in  Bolivia"  relates  public  employment  issues  to
overall  economic  trends  in  Bolivia. And,  John  R. Harris,  Edward  Andoh,
Kojo  Evlo,  and  Martha  Starr  have  analyzed  several  African  pay  and
employment  experiences  in  their  recent  paper,  "Experiments  in  Wage  Bill
Containment  in  Africa,"  sponsored  by the  Bank's  Special  Office  on  Africa.
In  addition,  Inayatullah,  "Public  Employment  and  Pay"  provides  a general
review  of  public  sector  employment  issues  in  developing  cuuntries,  from  the
viewpoint  of civil  service  senior  management.
2/  The  overview  papers  include  David  Lindauer,  "Parastatal  Pay  Policy  in
Africa,"  1986;  Lindauer,  Public  Sector  Wages  and  Employment  in  Africa:
Facts  and  Concepts,"  1981,  and  Lindauer,  Meesook  and  Suebsaeng,
"Government  Wage  Policy  in  Africa:  Summary  of Findings  and  Policy
Issues," 1986.- 19  -
In  general,  research  within  the  Bank  on  public  pay  and  employment
has synthesized  a large  volume  of data--for  the  most  part  on  Africa-
-analyzing  problems  and  suggesting  solutions.  This  research  has  brought
available  data  to  bear  on a topic  which  previously  had  been  subject  to  much
conjecture  and  few  facts. As such  they  represent  an important  advance  in
formulating  an informed,  coherent  analytic  framework  for  Bank  policy  in
this  area. Most  of the  studies  stop  short,  however,  of  providing  an
operational  guide  for  dealing  with  pay  and  employment  issues. For the  most
part,  the  studies  stress  the  economic  rather  than  the  institutional
dimensions  of the  problems. A survey  of this  research  suggests  several
possible  avenues  for  future  work:
*  Expansion  of the  data  base through  more in-depth  studies  of  pay
and  employment  problems  in specific  countries.
*  Comprehensive  studies  of government  service  incentive  systems,
including  analysis  of salary  structures,  career  paths,  non-wage
allowance  and  pension  systems,  and  relevant  tax  provisions  in
selected  countries.
*  Review  of severance  scheme  experiences;  follow-up  of selected
experiments.
O  Study  of political  and  social  consequences  of  pay  and  employment
reform.
v  Review  of case  studies  of employment  and  pay  experience  through
individual  sectors,  and  public  enterprises.
IV.  ISSUES  IN  PUBLIC  EMPLOYMENT  AND  PAY  REFORM
Even  at this  early  stage,  a  number  of issues  have emerged  from
the  Bank's  experience  with  public  employment  and  pay  reform. This  section
raises  some  of the  major  concerns  uncovered  by this  review. These  focua
both on the  content  of changes  in  employment  and  pay  policies  and  on
procedural  questions  about  the  Bank's  role  and  strategy  in  promoting
reforms.
The  Context  of Reform:  The  Importance  of  Politics
There  is  little  doubt  that  economic  crisis  is  often  a  powerful
catalyst  for  public  employment  and  pay  reforms. It is  also  obvious  that
political  factors  figure  significantly  in  conditioning  such  reforms,  but
such  factors  have  been  given  less  detailed  attention  in  Bank  operations.
Recent  Bank  experiences,  however,  indicate  the  need  to  examine  both
political  and  economic  variables  in  assessing  the  prospects  for  pay  and
employment  reform  in  any  individual  country. In  Ghana,  for  example,  the
impetus  to  undertake  major  reforms  ir,  civil  service  employment  patterns  was
largely  motivated  by the  desperate  state  of the  economy,  but the  incumbent
regime's  political  stability  also  appears  to  have  been crucial  to
Government's  willingness  to act  decisively  without  fear  of  being
overthrown.  Guinea,  partly  in response  to its  own  economic  crisis,  has
moved  quickly  with  pay  and  employment  reforms. But  Bank  staff  also
reported  that  reform  was  facilitated  by a general  climate  of revolutionary- 20 -
purpose  resulting  from  th_  end  of  many  years  of  one-man  rule. This  climate
has created  both  the  courage  to tackle  vested  interests  and  a willingness
to sacrifice  on the  part  of groups  such  as civil  servants,  who  may  be
affected  by sweeping  employment  reductions.  In  Niger,  the  ability  of a
stable,  authoritarian  military  regime  to give  full  commitment  to  employment
reform  is  reinforced  by the  absence  of organized  political  opposition.
Politics  can  also  pose  serious  obstacles  to  meaningful  employment
reform. In Peru,  Jamaica,  and  Guyana,  deteriorating  economies  motivated
changes  in  civil  service  employment  and  pay strv  tures,  but  political
constraints  derailed  reform  efforts. In  Peru,  the  populist  Garcia  regime,
whose  support  came  from  the  working  and  lower  middle  class,  chose  not to
implement  a salary  reform  skewing  wages  in  favor  of  higher  level  of
professional  staff,  many  of  whom  ware  associated  with the  previous  regime.
In  Jamaica,  early  commitment  to  pay  refor-m  for  the  civil  service  elite  was
present  at the  highest  level  in the  person  of Prime  Minister  Seaga. With
economic  decline  labor  unions  became  more  vociferous  and  Seaga  was
increasingly  threatened  by the  opposition  with  electoral  defeat. These
political  pressures  made  a reform  redistributing  civil  service  salaries
upward  difficult  for  the  Seaga  government.  While  there  was one  initial
attempt  to  reform  the  salary  structure  (in  1984),  later  efforts  were
stalled. Clearly,  in  electoral  policies  with  well  developed,  articulate,
and  powerful  interest  groups,  leaders'  calculation  of support  requirements
will  affect  their  willingness  to  undertake  bold  and  sensitive  steps  toward
pay  and  employment  reform.
Bank  staff  have,  for  the  most  part,  tended  to  be sensitive  to  the
political  complexities  of these  reform  efforts. The  need  for  a subtle
approach  to  pay  and  employment  issues  in  more  highly  developed,  politically
sophisticated  countries  was  forcefully  acknowledged  in  discussions  of
experiences  in  Thailand,  Jamaica,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Peru. Nonetheless,
although  individual  Bank  staff  exhibit  awareness  that  interest  groups  such
as labor  unions,  urban  workers,  students,  and  factions  of the  bureaucracy
may  have  tremendous  impact  on operational  outcomes,  there  is  little
systematic  analysis  of these  factors  in  Bank  sector  work  or lending
operations.  Indeed,  although  there  is  often  a recognition  that  some
measures  being  proposed  by the  Bank  and  undertaken  by Government  may  pose
significant  political  risk  or that  a  particular  policy  may lose  political
support,  there  is  relatively  little  attention  given,  for  example,  to
possible  means  by  which  reform  programs  can  be designed  to  help  reduce
those  risks  or  replenish  that  support.
RedeRloyment
Earlier  sections  of this  review  suggested  that  the  issue  of
redeployment  of retrernched  employees  has  not  received  significant  attention
in Bank  operations.  Indeed,  short  of the  assumption  of an  economic  upturn
resulting  in  increases  in  private  sector  employment  opportunities,  the
conseauences  of  Bank  prescriptions  for  employment  reduction  are  left
largely  unaddressed  in  most interventions.  Labor-intensive  public  works
programs,  retraining  programs  for  employment  in  other  sectors,  and  small
agriculture  and  business  credit  schemes  have  all  been  discussed,  but  such
proposals  have,  for  the  most  part,  been  initiated  by the  borrowers
themselves,  often  in the  absence  of adequate  technical  and  financial- 21 -
resources  for  implementation,  and  sometimes  in  a largely  symbolic  manner.
The  Bank  has  generally  refrained  from  active  involvement  in  these  schemes.
More  broadly,  Bank  sector  work  has  not,  by and  large,  carefully  analyzed
the  connections  between  public  employment  reductions  and  the  capacity  of
eit;.er  agriculture  or the  urban  labor  market  to  absorb  fired  government
workers. Nor  has it  assessed  the  capacity  of specific  sectors  to take  on
surplus  civil  servants,  or the  mechanisms  whereby  such  a  redeployment  could
take  place. Such  analysis  would  appear  to  be particularly  important  in
those  countries  where  the  private  sector  is  weak.  Ii the  Bank is  to
continue  and  deepen  its  involvement  in this  area,  more  comprehensive
analysis  of  employment  and  pay  questions  will  need to  consider  the
redeployment  issue. This  will require  not  only  more  systematic  attention
to the  issue  in  se^tur  work,  but  also,  at least  in  the  case  of retraining
schemes,  better  coordination  among  individual  sector  programs  within  the
Bank's  overall  country  program  strategies.
Timing  of  Reform
The  timing  requirements  of  pay  and  employment  reforms  appear  to
vary  with individual  circumstances.  No optimal  pace  or sequencing  of
policy  changes  could  be inferred  from  Bank  operations.  In  general,  salary
adjustments  seem  to  be made  all  at once,  while  employment  cuts  and
redundancy  payments  may  be phased  over  a long  period  of time. Gradually
phased  retrenchment  may serve  to  cushion  the  blow  and  thereby  dissipate
opposition.  On the  other  hand,  an incrementalist  strategy  of retrenchment
may  allow  contesting  coalitions  time  to strengthen.  Yet-to-be-dismissed
employees  may  become  demoralized  and  less  productive.  Also,  the  manner  in
which  severance  packages  are  disbursed  may  determine  the  fiscal  manuevering
room  of a government  in  subsequent  months. Deferral  of redundancy
payments,  for  instance,  may lighten  government's  financial  burden  and  open
up the  possibility  of non-payment  should  the  payments  later  prove
unaffordable.  Sequencing  affects  the  effectiveness  of  Bank  operations  as
well.  Phasing  reforms  over  time  allows  for  somtwhat  greater  capacity  for
monitoring  and  control  if  policy  changes  are  tied  to  phased  conditionality.
On the  other  hand,  the  deferral  of reforms  also  raises  the  possibility  that
the  political  will to  carry  them  out  will  dissolve  and  earlier  actions  on
the  part  of the  government  will  not  be followed  through  by the  rest  of the
reform  program.
The  question  of  whether  pay  and  employment  reforms  should  be made
in  a comprehensive  package  affecting  central  government  simultaneously  with
public  enterprises  remains  to  be answered. Clearly,  conditions  in  one
affect  the  other,  so attacking  the  problems  jointly  would  seem  to  be
sensible,  if  not  essential. In some  cases,  considerably  more information
is  available  for  employment  and  pay  issues  in  central  governments  than  in
public  enterprises.  The  uneven  quality  of data  often  impels  the  Bank  and
governments  to treat  the  two  areas  independently.
Information  Gags
As noted,  the  quality  of the  information  base  for  much  of the
Bank's  operational  work  on pay  and  employment  is  poor.  Bank  staff  working
in  this  area  are  confident  that  the  quality  and  quantity  of  pay  and
employment  data  can  be  increased.  The  accumulation  of  information  needs  to- 22 -
be tied,  however,  to actionable  objectives.  Indeed,  other  international
agencies,  including  the  Department  for  Technical  Cooperation  and
Development  of the  United  Nations,  have for  years  financed  data  collection.
But  in the  absence  of sufficient  high-level  political  commitment  to  change,
these  exercises  have  produced  little  reform.
Poor  or inaccessible  information  has sometimes  forced  Bank  staff
to  make  judgments  that  are  more instinctual  than  empirical. In  Jamaica,
the  Bank  promoted  a salary  scale  for  executive-level  civil  servants  that
was to  be 85%  of  public  enterprise  salaries. In the  absence  of reliable
information  as to the  level  of  salaries  required  to  attract  and  retain
high-level  civil  servants  or  of the  level  of salary  that  could  be
comfortably  financed  by the  government,  the  Bank  decision  was  based  on
intuitive  judgment. In  Costa  Rica,  Bank  staff  reported  that  data  on  public
sector  employment  were  not  available  when  recommendations  were  made  by the
Bank  through  policy  dialogue  to  reduce  employment.  Although  the  Fund
attached  conditions  related  to t'ha  wage  bill  to its  1985  standby  agreement,
reliable  numbers  for  employment  were  still  not  available.  These  data  only
became  available  at the  time  of the  release  of the  second  tranche  of the
SAL  in  1986,  which  was  conditioned  on  determining  the  number  of  public
service  employees.
Very little  information  is  available  in  the  Bank  about  the
experience  of other  donors  or countries  with  pay  and  employment  reforms,
particularly  the  successful  ones. Little  is  known,  as  well,  about  the
academic  institutions  or consulting  firms  that  may  have  proven  track
records  in  this  area.
Types  of  Bank  Interventions:  Suitability  for  Reform
The  views  of  Bank  staff  differ  with  regard  to the  appropriate
operational  instruments  or combinations  of instruments  for  work  on  public
employment  and  pay.  Some  staff  are  frustrated  by the  constraints  placed  on
achieving  lasting  reform  by the  use  of  essentially  short-term  SALs.
Several  point  to  cases  in  which  governments  met  conditionality  on paper  but
had  not  internalized  commritment  to  the  reform  objectives  and  were  therefore
inclined  to abandon  them  when  leverage  was  relaxed. 14 But  this  objection
could  be mitigated  if  the  SAL  were  one  phase  of  a longer  series  of SAL
operations,  so that  leverage  could  be sustained  over  a  more extended
period. SALs  were  also  judged  to  be more  effective  if  coupled  with
companion  Technical  Assistance  Loans  that  offered  institutional  support  for
SAL  conditionality.  Still,  most  Bank  staff  agree  that  those  reforms  that
have taken  place,  however  incomplete,  would  not  have  occurred  without  the
conditionality  of  a SAL. SALs  are  viewed  as imperfect  but necessary
instruments.
/  This is  a generalized  issue  in Structural  Adjustment  Lending. See
Geoffrey  Lamb,  "Institutional  Reform  in Structural  Adjustment  Lending,"
1984.- 23 -
The  less  threatening,  "softer-sell"  approach  that  a freestanding
technical  assistance  project  is  thought  to  provide  was favored  by some  Bank
staff  as a vehicle  for  pay  and  employment  reform  (as  well as  other  forms  of
institutional  restructuring).  In  cases  where  the  institutional
infrastructure  for  reform,  such  as trained  personnel  managers  and  a
functioning  personnel  management  system,  needs  to  be established,  technical
assistance  projects  were  deemed  particularly  useful. That  these  could
proceed  independently  of SAL  conditionality  was sometimes  considered  to  be
an advantage. The  Jamaica  Public  Administration  Project,  for  example,
assumed  a strategy  intentionally  distancing  personnel  management  and  salary
reforms  from  the  overall  employment  cuts  and  wage  bill  reductions  that  were
a  part  of the  Fund's  program. Salary  increases  for  higher  level  staff  were
linked  to  Jamaica's  SAL  III,  however,  and  it is still  unclear  if  the  slow
implementation  of these  reforms  uias  due  to or in spite  of SAL
conditionality.  In  general,  SALs  and  freestanding  T.A.  projects  are  not
considered  to  be mutually  exclusive.  Instead,  they  are  seen  as
complementary  instruments  with  somewhat  different  objectives.
In  a few  cases,  the  best  instrument  for  bringing  about  desired
changes  in  employment  and  pay  policy  was  ongoing  Country  Economic  and
Sector  Work  and  sustained  policy  dialogue.  This  is  particularly  applicable
to relatively  more  advanced  countries.  In Sri  Lanka,  for  example,  the
Bank's  involvement  in  pay  and  employment  was  through  sector  work  and
continuing  policy  discussions  with  high level  government  officials
interested  in  bringing  about  salary  structure  reforms. These  officials
were  reported  to  have  made  use  of  what they  considered  to  be high  quality
professional  advice  on the  part  of the  Bank  to reinforce  their  own  argument
for  reform  to other  members  of the  national  bureaucracy.  The  result  was  a
1986  salary  adjustment  and  a possible  technical  assistance  operation  to
support  the  policy  work  of  an interministerial  commission.  Ongoing  sector
work and  policy  dialogue  was  also  the  primary  approach  used  in  Thailand  and
Bangladesh,  although  in  the  latter  case  this  is  now  being  reinforced  by
conditionality  on a  public  administration  reform  study  under  Imports
Program  Credit  13.
Internal  Bank  Coordination
Coordination  and  communication  of Bank  activities  on  public  pay
and  employment  has  sometimes  been  weak.  Interventions  on these  issues  have
often  been  made  through  individual  sectors  witheut  coordination  with
overall  country  program  initiatives,  except  in  the  case  of public
expenditure  reviews  which  do seem  to faciittate  intersectoral  contact.
Moreover,  Bank  operations  staff  are  often  unaware  of  what  others  in  their
region  are  doing  in  this  area. Even  among  Public  Sector  Management
Divisions,  information  has  heretofore  been  spread  mostly  by word  of  mouth.
Coordination  and  commmunications  between  the  Bank  and  the  Fund  on  pay  and
employment  varies  significantly  from  one  country  to  another. In some
cases,  Fund-Bank  programs  are  closely  linked;  in  others,  there  is  virtually
no interaction  on the  issue.
Bank  Staff  Capacity
With  the  exception  of those  operations  that  have  been  managed  by
the  regional  Public  Sector  Management  Divisions, the  Bank's  involvement  in- 24 -
public  pay  and  employment  issues  has  been  carried  out  mostly  by country
economic  staff,  often  in  the  context  of a  much  broader  effort  to elaborate
and  agree  on an economic  reform  program. In  a few  cases  projects  staff
have  been involved  in  operational  work touching  upon  these  issues. On a
sectoral  basis  projects  staff  have  been  involved  in  reform  efforts. The
degree  to  which  these  staff  have  the  appropriate  professional  background
and  expertise  to  bear full  responsibility  for  pay  and  employment  issues
needs  to  be assessed  within  the  Bank  as  a  whole.
Suipervision
The  absence  of  on-the-ground  supervision  of pay  and  employment
reform  operations  has  been  cited  as a  major  constraint  on their
effectiveness.  Such  activities  require  very  close  review,  support  and
continuing  dialogue. Without  such  intensive  supervision,  they  can  easily
get  lost.  Such  attention  might  be supplied  through  a resident  mission  if
staff  time  were  made available  and  if such  work  were  accorded  a  high enough
priority. An alternative  solution  would  be to allocate  sufficient
supervision  time  so that  Washington  operational  staff  with specific
expertise  in this  field  could  thoroughly  address  these  issues.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Bank involvement  in  public  sector  pay  and  employment  reform  is  new
and  is  proceeding  on  a trial  and  error  basis. Definitive  lessons  about  the
appropriateness  or effectiveness  of approaches  currently  being  utilized
cannot  be drawn  from  such  a  brief  history. Still,  it  makes  sense  to take
account  of this  experience  as it  accumulates  in  an effort  to  discern
emerging  trends  and  to  raise  issues  for  future  activities.  This  has  been
the  purpose  of the  present  review,  which  should  be seen  as  an initial  step
in  an ongoing  assessment  process. The  paper's  findings  suggest  the
following  considerations  for  staff  working  in  this  area:
*  Political  factors  are  crucial  in  determining  the  success  of  pay
and  employment  reforms  in  many  countries. Systematic  analysis  of
the  politics  of the  reform  process,  largely  absent  from  Bank
sector  work  up until  now,  needs  to  be incorporated  into  CESW  and
in  direct  preparation  of Bank  projects.
*  Governments  must  feel  full  "ownership"  of  reforms,  or they  will
not succeed. In  pursuing  this  end,  a style  must  be struck  which
allows  for  the  appropriate  mix of  Bank  leverage  and  country
autonomy. Although  this  notion  has  become  something  of  a cliche
in institutional  development  circles,  it  is  worth  reasserting  with
regard  to  reforms  as sensitive  and  politically  difficult  as those
involving  public  pay  and  employment  issues.
*  Bank  pay and  employment  operations  have  tended  to take  a short-
term  perspective,  frequently  ignoring  the  medium-range
consequences  of  policy  prescriptions  for  pay  reform  and  especially
employment  retrenchment  programs. Issues  of redeployment,
retraining,  and  pension  and  severance  obligations  for  dismissed
workers  have  not  been  seriously  considered.  The  most  well-
intended  immediate  policy  measures  may  collapse- 25 -
down  the  road  if  such  longer  range  implications  are  not  addressed.
Responsible  action  in  this  area  will  require  a  more  comprehensive
approach  that  considers  all  stages  of the  reform  process,  and
makes  more  specific  provision  for  implementation  over  the  medium
term.
*  Bank  employment  and  pay  operations  often  have  multiple,  sometimes
conflicting  objectives,  usually  related  to fiscal  soundness,
bureaucratic  efficiency,  or developmental  goals. To the  degree
possible,  such  objectives  should  be made  explicit  and  trade-offs
among  them  clarified  from  the  outset. In cases  where  the  IMF  has
been active  on these  issues,  it  will  be important  to discuss  and
coordinate  Bank-Fund  policy  initiatives  to  ensure  that  mutual
objectives  are  fully  understood  and  appropriately  balanced.
e  Bank  operations  are  being  carried  out in  the  absence  of  adequate
information  about  key  pay  and  employment  issues. Basic  data  on
employment  numbers  and  comparative  salary  scales  for  central
government  and  parastatal  sectors  need  to  be collected  and
analyzed  for  reasoned  policy  formulation.  Through  an  expanded
program  of research  and  country  and  economic  sector  work,  more
also  needs  to  be learned  about  the  detailed  intricacies  of salary
and  career  incentive  structures,  non-wage  allowance  systems,
supplementary  benefit  schemes  such  as social  security  programs,
and  labor  market  absorptive  capacity,  to  name  a few  important
topics for further analysis.
*  Although  this  review  has  examined  only  system-wide,  central
government  reforms  in  pay  and  employment,  there  is  clearly  a large
body  of  experience  with such  reforms  at the  sectoral  and  state
enterprise  level. A comprehensive  review  of these  experiences
will  be essential  to  complete  this  preliminary  picture  of the
Bank's  progress  to  date  in  this  area.
*  No single  lending  instrument  could  be identified  in  this  review  as
the  most suitable  for  bringing  about  desired  changes  in  pay  and
employment  systems. In fact,  the  variegated  character  of country
cases  and  types  of pay  and  employment  problems  calls  for
flexibility  in  operational  approach  and  style. Although  SALs  have
proven  an effective  mechanism  for  stimulating  reform,  one-shot
conditionality  diminishes  the  chances  for  success. The  Bank,
therefore,  needs  to  consider  serial  conditionality  supported  by an
institutional  infrastructure  provided  either  through  specific  SAL
components,  companion  technical  assistance  projects,  or medium-
term  sectoral  support  projects  with institutional  development
components.
*  A consistent  country  strategy  toward  pay  and  employment  issues
must  be developed  at all  levels  of Bank  intervention.  These
include  central  state  and  local  government,  state  enterprises,  and
individual  sectors. Public  expenditure  reviews  provide  a  minimal
framework  for  cooperation  among  these  levels,  but  a more
systematic  methodology  for  coordination  is  needed  to  provide  the
necessary  program  coherence.- 26 -
*  Strategies  for  the  supervision  of Bank  employment  and  pay
operations  need  to  be re-evaluated.  Such  activities  clearly
require  intensive  and  sometimes  extensive  attention,  often  on the
ground. In developing  supervision  programs,  the  appropriate  role
of Bank  staff  and  the  proper  allocation  of staff  time  to these
activities  need to  be assessed.
*  The  complex  and  multidisciplinary  nature  of the  tasks  involved  in
pay  and  employment  operations  may  require  specialized  training  for
Bank  staff  and/or  recruitment  of  personnel  with  appropriate
expertise. For  some  activities,  good  consultants  need to  be
identified  to supplement  Bank  staff  capacity. In  addition,  the
Bank  should  encourage  countries'  own  efforts  to  perform  policy
analysis  on these  issues.
*  Finally,  although  the  Bank  seems  to  have  taken  a  lead  in the  area
of  public  sector  pay  and  employment  reform,  some  work  has  been
done  on these  issues  by developing  countries  themselves,  other
multi-lateral  and  bi-lateral  aid  agencies,  academic  institutions
or individuals,  and  independent  consultants  and  consultancy  firms.
In  addition,  there  is  much  to  be learned  from  the  experience  of
advanced  industrialized  countries  that  have  undergone  pay  and
employment  reforms  induced  by contracting  economies. This  outside
experience  needs  to  be reviewed  critically  to  expand  and  refine
the  range  of  operational  approaches  currently  used  by the  Bank.- 27 -
TABLE 1.  BANK  OPERATIONS  WITH EMPLOYMENT/PAY  COMPONENTS
(Aporoved  as  of  February  1987)
(in  Chronological  Order)
Ln/Cr
Ln/Cr  Ln/Cr  Approval  Amount
Country  Type  Number  Date  (USSm)
Guyana  SAL  Ln 1948  81/02  14.0
CAR  TAL  I  Cr 1150  81/05  4.0
Turkey  SAL  II  Ln 1987  81/05  300.0
Thailand  SAL  I  Ln 2097  82/03  150.0
Turkey  SAL  III  Ln 2158  82/05  304.5
Peru  TAL  Ln 2204  82/09  10.2
Mali  TAL  Cr 1307  82/12  10.4
Thailand  SAL  II  Ln 2256  83/03  175.5
Bannladesh  PA  Cr 1349  83/04  12.0
Jamaica  SAL  II  Ln 2315  83/06  60.2
Turkey  SAL  IV  Ln 2321  83/06  300.8
Uganda  TAL II  Cr 1434  83/12  14.2
Jamaica  PA  Ln 2423  84/05  4.5
Turkey  SAL  V  Ln 2441  84/06  376.0
Jamaica  SAL  III  Ln 2478  84/11  55.0
Guinea  TAL  Cr 1559  85/03  9.5
Mauritania  PE  TAL  Cr 1567  85/03  16.4
CAR  TAL  II  Cr 1581  85/04  8.0
Costa  Rica  SAL  Ln 2518  85/04  80.0
Costa  Rica  TAL  Ln 2519  85/04  3.5
Togo  SAL  II  Cr 1599  85/05  27.8
Togo  TAL  III  Cr 1600  85/05  6.2
Malawi  SAL  III  Cr 1644  85/12  30.0
Bangladesh  IPC  13  Cr 1655  86/02  200.0
Guinea  SAL  Cr 1659  86/02  25.0
Niger  SAL  Cr 1660  86/02  20.0
Senegal  SAL  II  Cr 1656  86/02  20.0
Bolivia  RIC  Cr 1703  86/05  55.0
Gambia  SAL  Cr 1730  86/08  5.0
CAR  SAL  Cr 1732  86/09  14.0
TOTAL  NUMBER  OF PROJECTS:  30- 28  -
TABLE 2.  BANK  OPERATIONS  WITH EMPLOYMENT/PAY  COMPONENTS





Guinea  Bissau  SAL
Haiti  SAL
Haiti  TAL
Mali  PE  TAL
Mauritania  TAL
Mauritania  SAL
Senegal  SAL  III
Senegal  TAL
Sierra  Leone  SAL
Sudan  TAL
Sri  Lanka  UNDP
Uganda  Economic  Recovery  Credit
TOTAL  NUMBER  OF PROPOSED  PROJECTS:  15- 29
TABLE  3.  COUNTRIES  UITH  BANK  OPERATIONS  IN
PUBLIC  SECTOR  PAY  AND  EMPLOYMENT
Region  Current  Proposet
Africa  CAR  CAR
Gambia  Ghana








Asia  Thailand  Sri  Lanka
Bangladesh
[AC  Bolivia  Bolivia




EMENA  Turkey- 30 -
















LAC  Costa Rica
Guyana
EMENA  Jordan
Tunisia- 31  -
TABLE 5.  MAJOR  DIAGNOSED  PPOBLEMS  FOR COUNTRIES
WITH  BANW  EMPLWYENT/PAY  INTERVTIONS
Excessive  Surplus
Wage  Civil
Bill  Servants  Erosion  Compression
Bangladesh  Bangladesh  Bangladesh  Bangladesh
Bolivia  Bolivia  Bolivia  Guinea
CAR  CAR  Jamaica  Guyana
Costa  Rica  Costa  Rica  Mali  Jamaica
Gambia  Gambia  Peru  Peru








Sierra  Leone  Senegal
Togo  Sierra  Leone
Uganda  Sri  Lanka
Togo
Turkey
Uganda- 32  -
TABLE 6.  BANK  OPERATIONS  WITH EMPLOYMENT/PAY  COMPONENTS
BY LENDING  INSTRUNENT
(As  of  Februarv  1987)
REGION  SALS  TALS  OTHER  TOTAL
West  Africa
Approved  6  6  0  12
Proposed  5  4  0  9
East  Africa
Approved  1  1  0  2
Proposed  0  1  1  2
South  Asia
Approved  0  1  1  2
Proposed  0  1  0  1
IAC
Approved  4  3  1  8
Proposed  1  2  0  3
EAP
Approved  2  0  0  2
Proposed  0  0  0  0
EMENA
Approved  4  0  0  4
Proposed  0  0  0  0
Total
Approved  17  11  2  30
Proposed  A  A  1  la
23  19  3  45TABLE 7.  BANK  OPERATIONS  BROKEN  DOWN  BY PAY AND EMPLOYIUNT  COMPONENTS
(hAnroved  Or  utder  Preoar  topn  as  of  FebMUar7  1987)
Data  Reform  Wage  &  Create/  Change/
Collection/MIS/  Salary  Structure  Redeployment  Strengthen  SOE Employment  &
CS  Census  MechanitatLon  (Decompression,  Training/  Personnel  Mgmt  Pay  (Separate  or
Surveyliead  Count/  of  Pers.  Magt  Grading,  Freezing  FreezelOut  ComenzationI  Iastitutions.  Align  vith  CS,  Cut
Studies  Diagnostics  Functional  Reviev  Fctio.  Cutting  Wage Bill)  Employment  !Severance  Commissions,  Etc..  Numbers,  Etc.)
Bangladesh  IPC  CAR SAL  Bangladesh  PA  Bangladesh  IPC  Bolivia  Bolivia  RIC*  Bangladsh  PA  Gambia  SAL
Bangladesh  PA  CAR TAL I  CAR SAL  Bangladesh  PA  CAR SAL  CAR SAL  CAR SAL  Guinea  SAL
CAR  SA  Gamble SAL  CAP TAL  II  Bolivia  Costa  Rica  SAL  CAR TAL II  CAR TAL I  Guinea  TAL
Cost&  Rica  TAL  Ghana  TAL*  Ghana  SAL*  CAR SAL  Gambia  SAL  Costa  Rica  SAL  Gambia  SAL  Jamica  PA
Guinea  TAL  Guinea  SAL  Ghana  TAL*  Costa  Rica  TAL  Ghan  SAM.  Gambia  SAL  Ghana SAL*  Jamica  SAL  III#
Haiti  SAL*  Jamaica  SAL II  Mali  TAL  Gambia  SAL  Ghana  TAL*  Ghana  SAL*  Chana  TAL  Mali  PEP
Jamaica  PA  Uganda  ERC*  Mauritania  SAL  Ghan  SAL*  Guinea  SAL  Ghana  TAL*  Cuinea  SAL  Niger  SL.
Jamaica  SAL III#  Uganda  TAL II  Mauritania  TAL'  Ghana  TAL*  Guyana  SAL  Guinea  SAL  Jamaica  PA  Sudan*
Maurcitanl  PE  Senegal  SAL  Gulnea  SAL  Haiti  SAM.  Guyana  SAL  Jamica SAL  III*  Turkey  5AL  II
Mauritanla  TAL*  Senegal  TALM  Haiti  SAL*  Haltl  TAL*  Haitl  TAL*  Mali  TAL  Turkey  SAL III
Niger  SAL  Sudan*  Haiti  TAL*  MaurLtania  SAL  Mauritania  TALZ  Mauritania  TAL*  W
Peru  TAL  Jamaica  PA  Niger  SAL  Senegal  SAL II  Peru  TAL
Senegal  SAL III  Jmalca  SAL  111  Senegal  SAL  IT  Senegal  TAL*
Sri Lanka  UNDP*  Maurltania  SAL  Slerra  Leone  SAL*  togo  TAL III
Thailand  SAL  I  MauritanL TMAL*  Turkey  SAL  II  Turkey  SAL  V
Thailand  SAL  II  Niger  SAL  Turkey  SAL  III  Ugand TMAL  1I
Togo  TAL III  Peru  TAL  Uganda  ERC*
Senegal  SAL
Sierra  Leone  TAL*
Thailand  SAL  I
Thailand  SAL  II
Togo  TAL  III
Uganda  ERC'




All)  38S  18X  24X  51S  38X  271  352  221
'  denotes  loans  under  preparation
5  denotes  cross-condltionality  vith  Jamaica  PA  as  only  pay  & smployment  component- 34  -
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